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[PAPER ABSTRACT] 
 
The paper examines how international cooperation practices influence the policy-making 
processes in Central and Eastern Europe; the focus is on the consequences for the democratization 
projects of these states in general and in particular – for their elites’ autonomy. 
The analysis is based on a qualitative comparative study of the impact a security and an 
economic/governmental international organization, NATO and the EU, have had on two Central 
and East European countries – Poland and Romania – which were diametrically opposite with 
respect to their elites’ autonomy before the cooperation process began. The study traces the 
chronological development of the EU’s and NATO’s involvement in Central and Eastern Europe, 
focusing on the content of cooperation and how it impacts elite accountability and 
control. Furthermore, since international regimes could influence the way domestic forces exercise 
control over their elites, the paper also examines whether the institutionalization of the cooperation 
processes limits or encourages the elites’ autonomy by redistributing elites’ and domestic groups’ 
access to procedural and cognitive political resources. The procedural instruments examined 
include policy-making initiative and institutions, while the cognitive resources studied are ideas 
and information to monitor and evaluate government performance. 
The paper concludes that the involvement of the EU and NATO in Central and Eastern 
Europe has served to enhance the quality of these democracies unevenly: the reforms promoted by 
the two international institutions not only provided Central and Eastern European executives with a 
better capacity to articulate national interests but also limited the state elites’ prerogatives; yet, 
through the institutionalization of the cooperation process, the executives were also empowered 
within the realm of those newly limited prerogatives. Whether they were originally developed as in 
Poland, or weak as in Romania, democratic forums were largely marginalized in the domestic 
policy-making process as control over the procedural and cognitive resources was redistributed in 
favor of the executive. In sum, the institutionalization of the EU and NATO involvement has 
served to widen the gap between state elites and citizenry by enhancing elite autonomy at the 
expense of representative institutions such as parliaments. This process, however, has not 
necessarily been EU- or NATO- specific but rather inherent to the internationalization of policy-
making. 
The analysis ends with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the 
democratization project of Central and Eastern European countries in the long term and for 
international cooperation in general. Thus the paper argues against the proponents of the belief that 
the institutionalization of democracy could be supported by the assistance of external forces, if 
domestic actors are lacking or weak and that integration in “the West” is Central and Eastern 
Europe’s surest way to democratization. The study also cautions against theories of international 
cooperation that treat states as unitary actors and overlook the domestic distribution of international 
collective action benefits.  3   
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THE TWO FACES OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 
 
 
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.  CEEC Post-communist Democratization Agenda 
With the collapse of state-socialism, most of the Central and East European Countries 
(CEECs) became committed to the liberalization of their political and economic systems. However, 
during the period of state-socialism/communism the public sphere had swallowed up the private; 
civil and political society had been either destroyed or prevented from developing; and the state had 
become intertwined with, and quite dependent upon, the regime.
1 Therefore, part of the 
democratization reform agenda grew to be the “de-etatization” of the political systems – a series of 
state-rebuilding processes aiming at the separation and explicit delineation of the role of the state 
bureaucracies meant to restore not only the boundaries between politics and economics, but also the 
boundaries separating public from private, the state from civil society, and the regime from the 
state.  A step in that direction was the revising/ redrafting of constitutions immediately after the 
collapse of state socialism but necessary was also a change in the nature of state power so that it 
would support and complement the democratization of the political system.  During the period of 
state-socialism the Communist Party/State elites possessed considerable – if unconstitutional – 
power, as the vanguard, and thus “trustee” of the interests of their peoples.  Hence, the successful 
democratization of CEE also entails on the one hand, decreasing the autonomy of the elites, and 
institutionalizing and strengthening the elites’ accountability; and on the other hand, increasing of 
the capacity of the state to actually penetrate society and to implement logistically political 
decisions throughout the realm.
2   
 
2.  International Environment 
In addition to domestic political and economic restructuring, most of the former state-
socialist countries opted for establishing political and economic relations with “the West” as a step 
to make the transition to liberal democracy and market economy irreversible in the immediate term 
and to acquire a new ‘home’ in the international system in the long run.
3 Consequently, they sought 
membership in almost all “Western” international organizations (IOs) and most importantly, in the 
European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  Both organizations 
made an explicit link between membership and the adoption of liberal norms and values.  
Accordingly, the EU and NATO began playing an important role in the transitions of CEECs by 
helping them democratize and thus meet the membership criteria.  As a part of the socialization 
processes meant to prepare these countries for membership, the two organizations have been 
providing blueprints for reform, examples to emulate, and direct expert guidance with the 
assumption that such aid can be crucial and can offer tangible solutions to the CEECs, most of 
which “lack the technical expertise to design the democratic institutions they desire.”
4 Important, 
then, becomes the question about the effects of this international assistance on the democratization 
process in CEE. 
 
                                                 
1 Valerie Bunce, “The Collapse of Socialism, the Soviet Bloc and Socialist States: An Institutional Account,” Columbia 
International Affairs Online Working Papers (Columbia University). 
2 After Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Powers of the State,” European Journal of Sociology (1985): 185-213. 
3 Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: a Constructivist Explanation,” Security Studies, 8.2-3 (1998-1999): 198-
234. 
4 Dessie Zagorcheva in Dan Reiter, “Correspondence with Harvey Waterman and Dessie Zagorcheva,” International 
Security, 26.3 (Winter 2001): 221-235.   5   
3.  Theoretical Context 
Scholars, observing the changes in the post-socialist world, were concerned about the 
possible democratic deficiencies of the CEECs, faced with the strong state-socialist legacies, the 
inexperience of post-communist elites, and the complications of a simultaneous transition from 
state-socialism to democracy and from planned to market economy.
 5  However, other intellectuals 
and eastern and western practitioners, triumphant in response to the Third Wave of 
Democratization, fostered the belief that the institutionalization of democracy could be supported 
by the assistance of external forces, if domestic actors were lacking or weak.
6 This body of 
literature was further expanded by the (practicing and academic) proponents of both NATO and EU 
enlargement, who advocated that integration in “the West” is the CEECs’ surest way to 
democratization.
7  At the same time, scholars studying the EU have been drawing attention to its 
democratic dilemma (utilitarian or democratic roots of legitimacy).
8 This has led some to speculate 
that the EU could be exporting its democratic deficit.
9 Some studies on the involvement of external 
actors in the civil society sector have also pointed to the problems of “exporting democracy” in 
general.
 10   
 
 
 
4.  Research Question 
How and to what degree did major IOs like the EU and NATO, so closely involved in the 
CEEC transition, affect the democratization projects of CEECs? Have Western efforts been helpful, 
irrelevant or detrimental to the consolidation of CEE democracies in the short and the long terms? 
Little work has been done in assessing either the planned or the unintended consequences of the 
                                                 
5 Philip G. Roeder, “The Revolution of 1989: Postcommunism and the Social Sciences,” Slavic Review, 58.4 (Winter 1999): 
743-756; Valerie Bunce, “The Transition from State Socialism to Liberal Democracy,” World Policy (1990); Jon Elster, 
Claus Offe, and Ulrich K.  Press, eds., Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998);  Claus Offe, “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing 
the Triple Transition in East Central Europe,” Social Research, 58.4 (Winter 1991): 865- 897. 
6 Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors, and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1995); Laurence Whitehead, The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the 
Americas (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996); Jack Snyder, From Voting To Violence: Democratization and 
Nationalist Conflict (New York, NY: Norton and Co., 2000); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1996); Samuel P.  Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Strobe Talbott, “Why NATO Should Grow,” New York Review of Books, 
42 (August 10, 1995): 27-30.  Arguments about the importance of external actors in bolstering civil society have been even 
more prevalent, for example: Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1998). 
7 Gale Mattox, “NATO Enlargement: A Step in the Process of Alliance Reform,” and Ronald Bee, “Boarding the NATO 
Train: Enlargement and National Interests,” in Robert Rachhaus, ed., Explaining NATO Enlargement (London, UK: Frank 
Cass, 2001); Frank Steves, “Poland and the International System: External Influences on Democratic Consolidation,” 
(Available Online 16 October 2001). 
8 Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., The European Union: How Democratic Is It? (London, UK: Sage, 1996); 
Brigitte Boyce, “The Democratic Deficit of the European Community,” Parliamentary Affairs, 46.4 (1993): 458-477; 
Shirley Williams, “Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community,” in Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, 
eds., The New European Community: Decision-making and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991); Jeffrey J.  
Anderson, ed., Regional Integration and Democracy: Expanding on the European Experience (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1999). 
9 Margit Bessenyey Williams, “Exporting the Democratic Deficit: Hungary’s Experience with the EU Integration,” 
Problems of Post-Communism, 48.1 (January/February 2001): 27-38; Heather Grabbe, “Europeanization Goes East: Power 
and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process,” Paper for the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Turin, 22-27 March 2002. 
10 Sarah L. Henderson, “Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Organization Sector in Russia,” 
Comparative Political Studies, 35.2 (March 2002): 139-167; Janine Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of 
Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989-1998 (New York, NY: St. Martin’s, 1998).   6   
cooperation between IOs and CEECs on limiting the institutional and practical elite autonomy.
11  
Yet, the desire to deny Communist Party/State elite the ability to set goals with marginal input or 
control by domestic groups was a focal point for the mobilization of opposition to state-socialism 
and the impetus for the democratization project in CEE.  Furthermore, the study of elite autonomy 
seems an important inquiry because of its bearing on issues like accountability, legitimacy, popular 
control and representation, responsiveness of elites.  To address this gap in the literature on CEE 
transitions, this study sets out to answer the question: how did cooperation with the two IOs 
influence the negotiations between political leadership heading CEE states and domestic groups 
either through civil society or the electorate? It should be noted, however, that this study concerns 
itself primarily with the relationship between the executive and the legislature, because since the fall 
of communism CEE parliaments have proven to be the most prominent venue for societal control 
over state elites and because the benefits of direct civil society access to the executive have already 
been questioned elsewhere. 
 
5.  Hypotheses 
Since IOs, like the EU and NATO, have been guiding CEECs efforts for democratization, 
and since part of the democratization of CEECs involves restricting the independent power of state 
elites, previous academic work suggests two hypotheses about the possible impact of the two IOs on 
elite autonomy:  
Hypothesis One, could be put forth by the proponents of external expertise: It could be 
expected that the intervention of IOs would contain initiatives and incentives that encourage the re-
building CEE states, so that the power of the political leadership heading CEE states to set out goals 
independent of routine negotiations with domestic groups is limited (but so that the state has the 
organizational capacity to implement whatever goals have been set up).  Most importantly, using the 
conditionality of the application process, social influence or persuasion, the IOs could have favored 
the de jure and de facto enhancing of domestic control over CEECs’ state elites.  Furthermore, the 
IOs could have set an example with the way they involved both the state elites and the institutions, 
overseeing CEECs’ foreign policy, in the cooperation process.   
Hypothesis Two, borrows insights from the literature on the problems of “exporting 
democracy” and the literature about the dilemmas involved in the institutionalization of international 
regimes: It could be expected that the intervention of IOs would be intended to promote the 
establishment of institutions that guarantee civic control over state elites.  However, given the 
complexity of the democratization problems, the short political deadlines for meeting the 
membership criteria with limited resources, and the constitutional “near-monopoly” of the executive 
in foreign policy, IOs might have been tempted to channel their influence mainly through the top 
governmental level rather than rely on the mercy of inexperienced CEECs parliament.  This 
empowerment of the executive and marginalization of parliaments would parallel EU practices that 
have led the integration priorities to take precedence over legitimacy and accountability in the EU 
structures.   
 
6.  Research Design 
To test these hypotheses, I evaluate not only the direction and ends of IO involvement but 
also the biases, mobilized in the political organization of CEEC-IO cooperation.  First, I analyze 
whether the institutionalization of the cooperation between the IOs and CEECs limits or encourages 
elite autonomy.  Domestic societies use both procedural and cognitive instruments to assert their 
control over executive actions.
12 Furthermore, as Moravscik points out, international regimes utilize 
                                                 
11 Elite autonomy is defined here as the autonomy of the political leadership heading CEE states (state elites) to set goals 
independent of routine negotiations with domestic groups. 
12 John Ferejohn, “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,” Public Choice, 50 (1986): 5-26.   7   
structures that correspond closely to these domestic instruments.
13 Therefore, international regimes 
can influence the way domestic forces exercise control over their state elites.
14 To assess this 
influence, I examine how the cooperation between IOs and the CEECs has redistributed the access 
of both elites and domestic groups to procedural and cognitive structures.  Second, in addition to 
studying the cooperation political structures, I also look more closely to the goals of cooperation and 
how they influence elite autonomy.   
Finally, to test the two hypotheses, I use a comparative study of the influence a security and 
an economic/government IO have had on two CEECs.  Thus I can distinguish both between the 
difference in IO impact within the same country and between the difference in IO impact among 
different countries.  In order to isolate a generalizable conclusion about the effects of international 
cooperation on elite autonomy, I examine two former socialist countries that were mostly similar 
before the cooperation process began but for their elite autonomy.  To assess the control domestic 
groups exercise over state elites, I rely on the strength of their civil societies since the final years of 
state-socialism and the development of their parliaments in the initial years of the post-communist 
transition.  Initially Poland had the most developed civil society and a robust parliament, which 
allowed for regular rotation of elites through elections.  Romania, on the other hand, had the weakest 
and most fragmented civil society and a parliament that did not prove to be a stringent check on 
post-socialist government activity.
15 Therefore, Poland and Romania seem suitable case studies for 
testing the two hypotheses.   
Given the difference between the two CEECs, I would expect to validate the two hypotheses 
in the following way: 
Hypothesis One: the IOs promoted reforms that assert institutional and practical decrease of 
elite autonomy.  The IOs also provided for a genuine involvement of both the executive and the 
legislature in the accession process, as well as equal participation of politicians and bureaucratic 
officials within the executive.  In Poland, the IOs should have stimulated the already existing 
democratic actors, whereas in Romania, the IOs should have paid particular attention to bolstering 
the development of democratic actors. 
Hypothesis Two: despite promoting the establishment of institutions of social control over 
state elites, the IOs’ practices created incentives for ignoring and circumventing of democratic 
forums, whether they are developed (operational, well-functioning) as in Poland or not, as in 
Romania.   
 
7.  Theoretical Framework 
Decreasing elite autonomy is a function of increasing the exercised societal control.  In other 
words, the relationship between the executives and domestic groups can be seen as an ongoing set of 
bargains, where the relative bargaining power determines the degree of autonomy of executive with 
respect to their preferred domestic policies.
16  To assert control over the executive actions, domestic 
groups must enjoy access to procedural and cognitive resources.  Procedural instruments include 
institutions and initiative.  “Initiative” stands for the authority to introduce or block the introduction 
of issues onto the domestic agenda.  “Institutions” are the procedures by which domestic decisions 
                                                 
13 Andrew Moravcsik, “Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International 
Cooperation,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Association, New York, NY (1-4 September 
1994) borrowing from Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
14 Andrew Moravcsik, “Why the European Community Strengthens the State...” 
15 Patricia Chilton, “Mechanisms of Change: Social Movements, Transnational Coalitions, and the Transformation Process 
in Eastern Europe,” in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In (Cambridge University Press, 
1995); Mitchell Orenstein, Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe (Ann Arbor, 
Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Daniel C.  Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human 
Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).  
16 Moravcsik, “Why the European Community…,” p. 4.   8   
are legally adopted.  Cognitive resources comprise information and ideas to monitor and evaluate 
government performance.  “Information” refers to political and technical knowledge.  “Ideas” 
include the supply of legitimate ideological justifications for specific policies.
17 Then, the relative 
bargaining power of executives and social groups can be evaluated in terms of their respective 
controls over the four domestic political resources: initiative, institutions, information and ideas. 
International regimes are said to: create a negotiating forum with rules governing bargaining 
and linkage; codify the legal liabilities of governments; facilitate the intergovernmental exchange of 
information; legitimate cooperation ideologically.
18  Those functions correspond closely to domestic 
practices used by domestic forces to exercise control over their government.  Therefore, 
international regimes could influence the way the domestic groups limit elite autonomy.  The 
process of international cooperation (especially preparation for membership) can redistribute control 
over domestic initiative and over the domestic procedures, under which policy decisions are ratified 
and implemented.  The exchange of information between governments can modify the domestic 
distribution of political and technical knowledge by addressing or creating specific information 
imbalances.  Finally, international cooperation can alter the set of ideas employed in ideological 
debates or reshape their justification. 
Given that international cooperation can redistribute control over domestic political 
resources, the question that this paper tries to answer – did cooperation with IOs help decrease elite 
autonomy – can be broken down into the following sub-questions:  
How has IO involvement influenced the authority of elites and domestic groups to introduce 
or block the introduction of issues onto the domestic agenda?  
How has CEEC-IO cooperation constrained or altered the actions of domestic legislative 
authorities?  
How has the exchange of information between IOs and CEECs modified the domestic 
distribution of political and technical knowledge?  
How has IO assistance changed the set of legitimate policies? 
 
8.  Overview of the Study  
This study of the impact of cooperation with NATO and the EU on Poland and Romania 
suggests that while the EU and NATO are democracy-promoting IOs, they have also in certain ways 
compromised the democratization projects.  In both Romania and Poland, the EU pushed forth many 
reforms necessary to build a stable liberal democracy, including the restructuring of the executive in 
the direction of the clear delineation of its responsibilities and improved inter-departmental 
coordination.  NATO not only established a balanced type of civil-military relations in both Poland 
and Romania but also broadened their scope to include other institutions governing the domestic 
order and civil society organizations in Romania.  As a result of the interaction with both IOs, the 
Romanian and Polish executives were reformed to be limited in their prerogatives but with a better 
capacity to articulate national interests.  However, there were also some costs of the cooperation 
process itself.  In particular, despite promoting the establishment of channels for domestic control 
over the executive, the IOs practices empowered the executive within its limited entitlement.  
Whether they are developed as in Poland or not, as in Romania, democratic forums were largely 
marginalized in the domestic policy process through the redistribution of control over the four 
domestic political resources in favor of the executive. 
Some words of caution concerning methodology and interpretation of the evidence are 
necessary.  The impact of the two IOs should not be overestimated: both the IO and candidate 
country governments have a vested interest in claiming that the IOs are the principal driver of most 
reforms.  It is also important to distinguish IO influence from other powerful exogenous and 
endogenous processes like globalization and the simultaneous transition from state-socialism to 
                                                 
17 This theoretical framework is borrowed from Moravcsik, “Why the European Community…,” p. 6. 
18 Keohane, After Hegemony.   9   
democracy and from planned to market economy.  A further distinction should also be made – that 
between intentional and unintentional effects of the IO involvement, especially in a context where 
the IO norms are oftentimes poorly understood and have been invoked without IO demand in 
various contexts.  Furthermore, some of the consequences are not so much a result of deliberate 
norms and models but rather a product of the incentives and interests created by cooperation 
institutionalization.  Finally, it is as of yet difficult to speak definitively about the effects of the two 
IOs on CEECs, given the dynamic nature of the process, which is still developing.   
A final cautionary note concerns the subject matter itself: foreign policy offers few 
opportunities for substantial input by legislatures.  Foreign policy issues are under minimal 
parliamentary scrutiny and oversight is usually limited to the ratification of government-initiated 
proposals.  Legislative involvement lengthens and complicates international cooperation and 
executive elites tend to exclude additional actors.  Yet, the cooperation between the two IOs and 
CEECs does not constitute just a foreign policy issue but something that affects the transformation 
of CEE societies.  Cooperation with the IOs changed not only the operation of domestic politics but 
also their nature.  Therefore, limited CEE parliament’s and its relevant social and economic 
committees’ involvement in the process is an especially disturbing trend because it diminishes the 
influence CEE societies have on their post-socialist transformation. 
 
The next part of the study examines the impact of the cooperation between NATO and 
Poland and between NATO and Romania.  Both processes were very much initiated and driven by 
the executive.  Initiative in the defense and security domains was largely transferred to the executive 
network of NATO and CEEC officials in both cases.  In Romania there was a further erosion of 
parliament’s involvement in defense and security matters because reform in these policy areas was 
promoted through governmental directives rather than parliamentary legislation.  However, some 
channels for civil society participation in those domains were open in Romania.  In both Poland and 
Romania, NATO supplied CEEC officials with technical and political information about its 
preferred policies, which not only mobilized support for (NATO-suggested) reforms but gave 
officials involved in the cooperation process the opportunity to alter the domestic distribution of 
information to their advantage.  Finally, NATO and CEEC executives successfully limited the 
legitimate set of ideas in defense and security to include only ones compatible with the alliance’s but 
at the expense of limiting debate in defense and security matters in general.   
The second subsection of this part evaluates the impact of cooperation between the EU and 
Poland and between the EU and Romania. Such cooperation resulted in a pronounced shift of policy 
initiation to the EU level with few opportunities for national input.  The executive was empowered 
with the colossal and important obligations of managing the integration process.  Parliaments are 
further restrained by fast-track procedures for passing EU-related legislation, which allowed them 
little input or oversight.  The cooperation process limited the ideas in circulation in many policy 
areas by the linkage between the EU and the success of CEEC transition and the CEEC obligation to 
synchronize their policies with the EU’s.  The redistribution of information as a result of the EU-
CEEC cooperation increased domestic competition and favored integration.   
The third part of this study summarizes the similarities and differences in EU/NATO impact 
between Poland and Romania and in EU/NATO impact within the same country.  The chapter ends 
with a brief discussion of the possible implications of the unintended empowerment of the executive 
in terms of the democratization process in CEE.   10   
 
PART TWO: IO INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
An important outcome of the global spread of democracy is that scholars and practitioners 
have become increasingly prone to regard democracy as a universal value whose roots can be 
nurtured in all regions of the world.
19 Accordingly, the discussion in academic and policy-making 
circles has gradually shifted to whether and to what degree state and non-state actors should and 
can be actively involved in democracy promotion abroad.  Foreign influence has often been seen to 
provide an international context that can facilitate the development of democratic practices within a 
given country.  The experience with international assistance before the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
revealed the need to establish appropriate levels of political commitment and bureaucratic 
competence in recipient countries as a prerequisite for successful economic change.  This 
observation with the theoretical justification of neo-liberalism provided for “the integrated Western 
perspective on the role of economic aids and loans, involving simultaneous and symbiotic 
transformation of economic systems through structural adjustments and political change.  Thus 
evidence of good governance went beyond sound financial management to include legitimate, 
institution-aliased and democratic modes of political decision making.”
20 In other words, around the 
time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, democracy promotion had become both an end and a means of 
international assistance. 
It was not until the Cold war’s end that democracy promotion became an explicit goal of 
EU foreign policy.  EU’s initial preoccupation with the changes taking place in EE was soon 
transformed into action because of the mandate the European Commission received to coordinate 
aid for the CEE transition to market economies, which was subsequently broadened to include 
democracy promotion.  In 1989 EU politicians began linking economic development with political 
freedom in declarations on developmental issues and in 1991 transition to democracy became 
condition for receiving EU assistance.  Only in 1992, however, did the European Parliament insist 
on adding a special democracy line into the general budget for that year, which forced the 
Commission to create a special democracy component within its assistance program, PHARE.  In 
the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht emphasized that the development and consolidation of democracy is 
one of the EU’s most important aims but also allowed for separate actions on the part of individual 
EU members in addition to the system of “joint actions”.  The complex web of competencies and 
diverging interests, as well as the complex EU institutional framework explains the incoherent and 
inefficient nature of EU foreign policy initiatives, within which democracy promotion remains a 
low priority issue.
21 
EU’s democracy program was limited to the PHARE program. Democracy promotion has 
encompassed several specific areas: strengthening parliamentary practice and organization; 
promoting transparency in public organizations and public management; developing NGOs and 
other civil society; ensuring the strengthening of an independent and responsible media; civic 
education and promoting and monitoring of human rights. Each of those components was perceived 
as contributing to the strengthening of democratic structures and the promotion of cross-cultural 
cooperation, primarily through involvement in partnerships between local and regional authorities, 
and NGOs.  Even though NATO did not sponsor an explicit democracy promotion program, 
through its Partnership for Peace program, the alliance has encouraged democratic control over the 
armed forces and transparency of national defense planning and budgeting – policies essential to 
democratic consolidation.  
                                                 
19 Peter Schraeder, “Promoting an International Community of Democracies,” in Peter Schraeder, Exporting Democracy: 
Rhetoric vs Reality (Boulder London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). 
20 Mike Mannin, “Democratic Governance in CEE: the Conditions for Change,” in Mike Mannin, ed., Pushing Back the 
Boundaries: the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999): 
98-132, p. 105. 
21 Gorm Rye Olsen, “The European Union: An Ad Hoc Policy with a Low Priority,” in Peter Schraeder, Exporting 
Democracy: Rhetoric vs Reality, (Boulder London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).   11   
Moreover, the enormous benefits and demanding requirements of membership created 
conditions for substantial influence of the two IOs on CEE domestic policy choices.  Example at 
hand is the requirement that countries aspiring membership in NATO/the EU must adopt certain 
level of democratic standards before being considered for accession. The requirement has provided 
powerful incentive even for countries, perhaps more interested in the presumed economic or 
security benefits of membership, to re-fashion their political systems in a more democratic 
direction. EU and NATO enlargements involve different processes that affect to some extent 
institutional and policy transformations in CEEC:
22 
•  Aid and technical assistance: By providing resources for the implementation of IO models, 
the EU/NATO have not only changed the priorities in the government agenda but have also helped 
CEE pay for transposing IO standards. Technical assistance, on the other hand, has facilitated 
building the CEEC institutional capacity to use IO practices. 
•  Benchmarking and monitoring: progress toward IO accession has become a central issue in 
CEE political debates, so IOs have influenced policy and institutional development through 
monitoring applicants’ performance and ranking candidates (benchmarking).   
•  Advice: Both IOs have programs, through which EU/NATO officials are seconded in CEE 
ministries and other public administration.  IOs officials work closely with their CEEC counterparts 
over overall institutional reforms and policy direction largely through the alteration of beliefs and 
expectations of domestic actors leading to changes in cognition and preference formation.  
•  Gate keeping: access to negotiations and further stages in the accession process and aid and 
benefits have been conditional on progress in requirement fulfillment. 
•  Models: legislative and institutional templates are provided by the EU through the process 
of legal transposition of the Union’s laws and rules and harmonization with EU regulations.   
 
NATO INVOLVEMENT IN CEE 
This study explores how cooperation with two international organizations (EU and NATO) 
has been affecting the democratization struggle of two Central and Eastern European Countries 
(Poland and Romania) in the area of limiting elite autonomy. This part of the study looks at the role 
NATO played in Poland and Romania. A central part to the alliance’s involvement has been reform 
of civilian authority. There are three distinct types of civil-military relations:
23 
Balanced: Civilian and military responsibilities are clearly distinguished and the latter are 
subordinate to the former. The president and the minister of defense are assigned political 
functions, and the highest-ranking officer – command of the military forces. 
Coordinate: The minister of defense is limited to nonmilitary administrative duties and the 
military chief discharges his military functions directly under the president but the level of his 
authority with direct access to the president allows him to make political decisions. 
Vertical: The minister of defense and the highest-ranking officer have identical 
responsibilities. The military chief is given control over all the activities of the ministry, 
specifically military command and planning. Even though he is formally subordinated to the 
minister, the latter may be reduced to a figurehead.  
The coordinate and the vertical types of civilian authority could be inconsistent with 
civilian control. The alliance has, therefore, promoted the balanced type of civil-military relation in 
order to maximize civilian control in CEECs.  
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A.  NATO AND POLAND 
A.1.  Introduction 
This part of the study addresses the specific case of NATO’s impact on curbing elite 
autonomy in national defense and security issues in Poland.  Since the beginning of its transition in 
1989, Poland officially expressed its aspirations for membership in NATO.  While aiding the 
country’s application and later its preparation for integration into the alliance, NATO had the 
opportunity to influence the reform trajectory of Poland.  The alliance was particularly active in 
Poland’s civil-military reform and the reorganization of the armed forces.  To assess the effects of 
cooperation between NATO and Poland on elite autonomy, I briefly introduce the establishment of 
civil-military relations prior to NATO involvement.  I then describe the structures of initiative, 
institutions, ideas, and information in terms of the access that both elites and domestic groups have 
to the process of international cooperation.  An outcome of the cooperation with positive effect on 
Poland’s democratization project was the reform of civil-military relations.  The highest-ranking 
officer was denied direct access to the executive: he could no longer get involved into politics easily 
and thus undermine civilian control.  Furthermore, while the transforming the civil authority over 
the armed forces, Poland also reformed the executive by clearly delimiting the prerogatives of each 
executive institution in defense, security and foreign affairs matters. On the one hand, this reform 
effectively increased the executive’s capacity to exercise control over the armed forces.  On the 
other hand, such delineation decreased the tension between and increased the cooperation of the 
executive bodies.  However, those benefits came at the expense of the overall empowerment of the 
executive.  I conclude that the NATO-Poland cooperation was institutionally and in practice 
channeled through the executive.  The collaboration was initiated by a small group of NATO and 
Polish officials.  NATO further preferred to rely on and pressure the executive for defense policy 
initiation.  The executive came to guide the country into adopting the “right” (reflecting NATO 
values) legislation.  By presenting alliance membership as a strategic cultural choice, the NATO-
Polish elite changed the security debate to preclude debate on NATO membership or on the NATO-
supported reorganization of the armed forces.  As a result, the pre-NATO involvement type of civil-
military relations was changed and the policy of Territorial Defense was substituted with emphasis 
on out-of-area operations.  By limiting the set of legitimate ideas, NATO and Polish officials created 
a seeming consensus.  This consensus, however, led to the marginalization of the parliament as a 
democratic forum for debate.   
 
A.2 Polish Armed Forces Reform at the Beginning of the Transition 
Under state-socialism the military was under civilian – if undemocratic – control.  The 
armed forces were led by a minister of defense, who was also the highest-ranking military officer 
but who was controlled by the Communist Party at the domestic level, and the Warsaw Pact Joint 
Command and the commander of the Soviet Forces in Poland at the international level.
24 With the 
fall of communism in 1989, Poland opted for establishing a democratic political system, which 
required a corresponding restructuring of the Polish armed forces.  Immediate objectives were the 
re-nationalization and the depolitization of the armed forces.  Also pending were the civilianization 
of the military and the establishment of democratic civilian control.  Finally given these sweeping 
changes in the character and the organization of the armed forces, further restructuring was 
necessary to accommodate Poland’s new security policy and defense doctrine. 
By autumn 1990, Poland reasserted full command of its own army, reestablished jurisdiction 
over its units, and abolished the last remnants of communist control over the Polish military.
25 An 
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early decision (July 1991) on restructuring Polish armed forces was taken upon the recommendation 
of the inter-ministerial Commission for Reforming the Organization of National Defense, chaired by 
the then head of the Office of Ministerial Council, Jan Zabinski.  Having evolved in the course of 
three administrations (the Mazowiecki, Bilecki, and Olszewski ones) and being approved by the 
State Defense Committee, the Zabinski Commission Report gained credibility and consolidated a 
consensus from political elites on civil-military relations and the role of the armed forces in Poland.  
It became a blueprint for the military reforms between 1991-1994 by recommending the 
appointment of a civilian minister of defense, the division of ministry of defense into civilian-
military and military components and their restructuring, and the establishment of effective 
parliamentary oversight.
26 
By 1991, the recommendations of the Zabinski Commission were implemented.  In the 
years between 1992 and 1995 there was little further change in the civil-military balance. The 
established concept of civilian authority can be defined as coordinate,
 because of the division of 
military and administrative functions immediately below the executive.  Moreover, the executive 
(the president more than the minister of defense) controlled the armed forces through General Staff.  
Finally, the years between 1992-1995 were years of continuing tension between the presidency and 
the ministry of defense for control over the armed forces – a struggle,
 which limited the executive’s 
capacity to exercise control over the armed forces.
27  Parliamentary control, too, was relatively weak 
by basic law and further weakened by the lack of qualified staff to serve on the National Defense 
and Foreign Affairs commission and the frequently changing composition of Polish parliaments.  
The military was de facto autonomous.
28  
In brief, the nature of the Polish military tradition
29 and the institutional weakness of the 
executive at the beginning of the transition obstructed the establishment of a civilian authority over 
the armed forces of the type deemed necessary by the NATO and Polish officials who initiated the 
enlargement process.  NATO involvement in the second half of the 1990s can be understood only in 
the context of the alliance helping these Polish elites to recast the role of the military in Polish 
society so that it would be compatible with NATO’s civilian democratic control, collective security, 
and joint command. 
 
A.3 Impact of NATO Practices on Elite Autonomy in Defense and Security Matters 
A.3.1 Impact on Domestic Initiative  
NATO-Polish cooperation was conceived by a small group of NATO and Polish officials.  
In 1990 - 1991, after the de-sovietization and re-nationalization of the armed forces, Poland went 
through a wide-ranging debate about the nature of domestic governing institutions and possible 
security arrangements.  However, a small but well positioned group of reformers believed that 
Poland would become part of a more successful civilization by imitating Western authority relations 
between the military and the state.
30  Before NATO had officially decided on enlarging, and before 
the question of membership in NATO was put forth for national debate in Poland, the pro-NATO 
Polish reformers, together with NATO officials, cooperated to realize NATO expansion.  Even 
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though Poland publicly suggested alliance enlargement in 1991, it was high-level NATO officials 
who had coached the Polish elites.  Poland was encouraged to propose the idea, so that it would 
enjoy legitimacy as a voluntary initiative.
31 In a document from December 21, 1991 Prime Minister, 
Jan Olszewski, declared officially Poland’s desire for membership in NATO. 
Despite the initial negative response from NATO, the Polish government made entry into 
NATO an official policy goal.  In creating Poland’s aspiration to join the alliance, NATO and Polish 
officials intentionally made efforts to produce interests at the elite and public levels that might have 
not otherwise come into being. However, NATO had to further rely on the executive to initiate 
defense policies, so that they would be compatible with the alliance’s own.   
In many instances Polish officials anticipated the reforms necessary for Polish integration 
into the alliance.  Hanna Suchocka’s government paralleled the 1991 Alliance’s New Strategic 
Concept: documents that regulated Polish defense policy did not recognize any state as a threat and 
expressed Poland’s concern about regional instabilities since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
32  
Also, in 1993, Minister of Defense, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, sought to lay a comprehensive set of 
regulations that would become the foundations for civilian democratic oversight in a way that is 
acceptable to Poland’s Western partners.  In other cases, however, the Polish officials failed to 
modify certain policies that NATO regarded as problematic. For instance, the alliance did not accept 
the civil-military relations established at the recommendation of the Zabinski Commission as 
civilian authority.  NATO officials interfered to have Polish officials design and promote the 
reforms, deemed necessary by the alliance. In either case, defense and security policies were 
coordinated with NATO rather than with parliament. Since NATO recommendations became 
preconditions for membership, reform was tailored to reflect NATO objectives even if those differed 
from Polish tradition or social preferences. The coordination of reform in defense and security 
matters with NATO left little room for domestic initiative or direct domestic control and gave the 
alliance the opportunity to participate in crafting basic institutions of the Polish state. 
 
A.3.2 Impact on Ideas 
NATO helped change the nature of Polish national defense debate and “altered the criteria 
by which Polish politicians could win legitimacy.”
33  The alliance taught Polish reformers to express 
their aspirations for membership in a way acceptable to the West
34 and so that in Poland accession to 
the alliance precluded other security alternatives.  NATO coached Polish elites to phrase NATO 
membership not only as the best possible security guarantee but also as an important cultural choice.  
The linkage between NATO membership and Poland’s national interest was so salient in the 
domestic political arena that accession to the alliance could not be rejected even by factions critical 
of NATO membership. Since in Poland there was a tradition of a desire to be accepted by the West, 
as a part of “Europe” and NATO membership was framed as “a return to Europe,” all parties had to 
prove their democratic credentials and advance on the way towards Europe.  However, the thinness 
of domestic debate also meant that Poland was purchasing a policy package without a clear idea of 
its contents, to which the country might not have necessarily subscribed had there been a meaningful 
debate about the meaning and implications of integration. In other words, NATO set the agenda, 
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“focusing the security debate around how and when Poland could join the alliance, and around 
which domestic reforms Polish politicians would have to implement in order to prove Poland’s 
Western credentials.”
35 The alliance also used its authority as the security provider for the North-
Atlantic community to change the normative foundation of the Polish defense and security 
institutions.  NATO and some pro-NATO Polish officials emphasized the alliance’s experience to 
legitimize NATO’s recommendations as the best, the right alternative. Thus, the idea of security as 
territorial defense was substituted with the objective of achieving regional stability. Furthermore, the 
nature of the civil authority over the armed forces was changed to reflect balanced civil-military 
relations. 
  
A.3.2.1 NATO and Civil-Military Relations 
After the Cold war there were social groups and corresponding elites who favored a 
continuation of the prominent role of the armed forces in Polish politics.  Their preference was 
institutionalized with the establishment of coordinate civil authority.  President Lech Walesa, too, 
believed that a strong and effective military was a necessary attribute of a competent state.
36 He 
supported the generals’ de facto autonomy, consolidated under an expanded authority of the 
president.  But as NATO became officially involved in Poland’s military reform, this position 
became untenable. The established coordinate type of civil-military relations were deemed 
undesirable by NATO and some Polish reformers.  The highest-ranking officer had direct access to 
the executive and could easily get involved into politics, thus undermining civilian control.   
NATO insisted that the only legitimate model is where civilian authority is shared between 
the president, the parliament and the government; or what has been defined as a balanced type of 
civil authority.  After the alliance raised serious questions about the nature of civil-military relations 
in Poland around 1993, Minister of Defense, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, responded by introducing new 
reforms in budgeting and the army's force structure in line with NATO’s expectations.  However, 
before the implementation of the set of laws, the government fell.  To retaliate against President 
Lech Walesa’s extensive interference in defense ministry appointments, the next Prime Minister 
Waldemar Pawlak fired the Minister of Defense and appointed in his place an old-line communist 
who reversed Onyszkiewicz’ regulations.  Because at this time Poland was trying to burnish its 
candidacy for the NATO-initiated Partnership for Peace (PfP), this step expedited the collapse of the 
Pawlak government.
 37  This example well illustrates how even maintaining the status quo against 
NATO prescriptions was untenable.  
In January 1994 NATO launched Partnership for Peace, which became instrumental for 
teaching CEE about the necessity and importance of the NATO-advised type of civil-military 
relations.  PfP was a way for NATO to prepare CEECs to be better able to cooperate with the Allies 
both militarily and politically in future peace-keeping and humanitarian operations. PfP mainly 
worked for improving the military compatibility and interoperability between CEECs and the 
Alliance.  However, a small portion of the program was devoted to ensuring democratic control of 
defense forces and encouraging the internalization of the liberal values and norms of the Alliance 
(articulated as the Perry principles by U.S. Secretary of defense, William Perry, in Munich in 
1995).
38 Through PfP the Alliance instructed Poland on “the meaning” of those principles and 
conveyed how important they are to winning Western support necessary for membership.
39 The 
importance of the institutionalization these values and norms was further publicly emphasized by the 
1995 Study on NATO Enlargement.  It not only officially demonstrated NATO readiness to expand 
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its membership but also emphasized the importance of shared values, democratic practices, and 
collective defense principles.   
In response to NATO’s growing dissatisfaction with Polish “weak civilian control,” the then 
Deputy Minister of Defense, Andrzej Karkoszka, initiated the legislation necessary to recast 
government defense institutions according to NATO prescriptions.
40 The Law on the Office of 
Ministry of Defense re-subordinated the General Staff to the Ministry of Defense. Later the role of 
the officers in defense planning was further weakened by eliminating the financial section within 
General Staff and moving its functions to the ministry.
41 Finally, the new legislation also delimited 
the prerogatives of each executive institution in defense, security and foreign affairs matters, thus 
effectively increasing the executive’s capacity to exercise control over the armed forces and 
decreasing the tension between the Presidency and the Cabinet. 
However, the codification of the norms NATO recommended was not a result of the 
involvement of society in a consensus-building process around those norms. The Polish political 
elites and public had already consolidated a consensus on civil-military relations reflected in the 
Zabinski Commission Report, so reform of the civilian authority was anchored through the salience 
and tactical use of the norms imported by NATO rather than through any constructive debate and 
assessment of policy options. NATO’s claims about the benefits and necessity of balanced type of 
civilian control, echoed by Karkoszka and other Polish officials, coached by the alliance, 
legitimated this kind of civilian authority and led to the association of those norms with the 
advancement of the country’s national interest.
42 Moreover, CEECs thought that consensus is a sign 
of the maturity and stability of their democracy, and would improve their image abroad, so 
consensus should be maintained or forged at any price.
43  Hence, there was little debate over 
NATO-promoted reforms, or as Jerzy Szmajdzinski, Vice Chairman of the Sejm's Commission of 
National Defense, suggested, “parliament would support government decisions by special 
statements but decisions about support for the alliance should not be subject to long disputes in the 
chambers of Parliament.”
44  However, the lack of consensus-building process around the adoption 
of a norm, which differed from Polish tradition, made the implementation of balanced type of civil-
military relations difficult.  
Given the resistance to the implementation
45 of the Law on the Office of Ministry of Defense 
in 1996, NATO released to Poland unofficially the Defense Planning Questionnaire.  This was a 
restricted NATO document used by the alliance as a checklist to assess the country’s commitment 
to democratic values, civilian control and collective security procedures.  It was used by the 
executive as a guideline to set the reform agenda and put pressure on other political and military 
actors to have the reforms implemented.  In 1997 NATO invited Poland to join the alliance.  The 
1998-report submitted by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “noted the range of 
institutional changes Poland had undertaken to codify civilian control over the armed forces,” and 
recommended that the US Senate support the accession of Poland.
 46  Poland was granted 
membership on March 12, 1999. 
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In sum, the evolution of civil-military relations in Poland well illustrates how NATO-Poland 
cooperation redefined civilian authority.  At the beginning of the Polish transition a small group in 
the executive framed NATO membership not only as the best possible security guarantee but also as 
an important cultural choice. Repeated declarations by those authoritative political figures linking 
NATO membership and Poland’s successful return to Europe made the connection so salient in the 
domestic political arena that those who called into question the NATO-Polish cooperation were seen 
as acting against Poland’s national interest. This discourse, however, precluded any further 
consequential opposition or debate on defense and security issue. Even though this seeming 
consensus facilitated the de-legitimization of a coordinate type of civil-military relations and the 
legitimization of a balanced type, it was at the expense of the marginalization of parliament as a 
forum for democratic discussion and societal input.  
 
A.3.2.2 NATO and Polish Security Institutions 
As late as 1997 NATO came to circumscribe another theme in the Polish national defense 
debate.  NATO recast the role of the military in Polish society so that it would be compatible with 
NATO’s collective security and joint command.  In Polish history the military had become the 
symbol of national survival.  The role of the armed forces was perceived to be to defend Polish 
autonomy, territory and internal stability.  This national tradition and vision informed the secondary 
reorganization of the armed forces in Poland.  Preparing for the 1997 parliamentary elections, 
members of the Solidarity Electoral Action and Polish Peasant Party began promoting Territorial 
Defense. The policy recommended a halt on the contraction of the armed forces and that 60% of the 
projected total armed forces be assigned to defending the territory around their bases. Territorial 
Defense was meant to include all social institutions rather than being the domain of governing 
officials and the armed forces. The Policy became a heated domestic debate not only about the 
availability of resources to fulfill Territorial Defense but also about its ideological underpinnings: 
Would it lead to militarization of the society and resurgence of political neutrality and defense-self-
sufficiency? How compatible was it with integration in NATO?   
NATO objected to Territorial Defense because it was questioning the credibility of NATO 
security guarantees and was portraying the Alliance as antagonistic to Russia.  NATO officials also 
questioned the efficacy of Territorial Defense.  However, the proponents of Territorial Defense were 
voted into office in 1997.  NATO responded directly and privately.  “In closed door meetings, 
NATO representatives, in delegations to Poland and to the Polish delegations in Brussels, repeatedly 
stressed that they would prefer that Poland focus on the basic issues of integration and compatibility 
with the alliance rather than expending effort and resources on territorial defense.”
47 Yet, the alliance 
could not persuade Polish politicians that NATO’s move away from Article 5 (where Territorial 
Defense would fall) toward out-of area operations is consistent with Polish interests. 
In a 1998 meeting with the Polish Deputy Minister of Defense, Romuald Szeremitiew – the 
most ardent and powerful civilian-supporter of Territorial Defense – American officials insisted that 
Szeremitiew should not pursue that plan.
48 The Minister of Defense was told that Territorial Defense 
was unnecessary since NATO would not abandon Poland and Russia did not pose a threat.  After the 
meeting, the government all but dropped their territorial defense plans.
49 In addition in 1998, the 
Sejm and Senate passed the law concerning the use of the Polish Army abroad in operations 
following from international agreements and other allied obligations.  This step was taken to align 
Poland’s defense strategy with NATO’s emphasis on out-of-area operations even though Polish 
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people were not supportive of military activity outside the range of the collective defense of the 
NATO area
50.   
The fall of Territorial Defense demonstrates how NATO altered the legitimate set of ideas 
about the role of Polish military in social life and national security.  The tradition of military 
prominence was no longer justifiable after 1998.  NATO further acted to replace Polish threat 
perceptions (threat coming from the East) with ones compatible with NATO’s own (threat coming 
from regional instabilities).  Most of the times, NATO was successful in securing the support of the 
Polish executive. The government was held responsible by the electorate for the country’s 
advancement towards Europe, so all Cabinets cooperated with the alliance and were receptive to its 
reforms recommendations. As the fate of the Pawlak government demonstrates any administration 
seen to obstruct Poland integration with the West was quickly brought down. However, as the 
Territorial Defense example illustrates, when persuasion and social influence failed, NATO was 
prepared to use any means to assure government compliance. NATO’s direct and behind the closed 
doors pressure on the executive to abandon an important part of its electoral campaign was not only 
problematic in terms of its legitimacy, but also created a precedent for executive eluding popular 
representation and democratic accountability. 
 
A.3.3 Impact on Information 
The NATO-Poland cooperation had a profound effect on the domestic distribution of 
technical and political knowledge.  To mobilize support for their cause, NATO and Polish officials 
used primarily information about the political constraints imposed by the preferences and power of 
the alliance. The 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement spelled out to the CEE public what reforms the 
alliance expects from applicant countries to consider them for membership.  The 1996 release of the 
NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire had one sole purpose – to mobilize Polish political elites 
behind the type of civil-military relations preferred by NATO.  Finally, NATO with the help of 
Polish officials publicized Collins/Meyers report, “NATO’s Military Enlargement: Problems and 
Perspectives,”
51 to demonstrate to the Polish public and political elites the persisting “deficiencies” 
in civilian control over the armed forces, and to raise anxiety over whether Poland was sufficiently 
qualified to join the alliance.
52  
Since Polish aspiration to membership in the alliance was very strong, NATO could disarm 
opposition by appealing to the Polish fear of exclusion.  An example at hand is the forcing out of 
office of the Chief of General Staff Wilecki.  Wilecki was resisting the recommended subordination 
of General Staff to Ministry of Defense and NATO was unable to change his behavior. The alliance 
applied direct pressure: an US official told the Polish president that US Senate ratification is 
uncertain as long as Wilecki is in office.
53 Still, President Kwasniewski was reluctant to remove 
Wilecki because of his broad support and powerful constituency.  Then NATO and Polish Deputy 
Minister of Defense, Andrzej Karkoszka, without the president’s knowledge and against his will, 
described to the New York Times the resistance of Wilecki and General Staff generals to the terms 
of NATO membership.  Then, the same article
54 was publicized in Poland, so that the president then 
had no choice but to remove Wilecki for impeding progress to NATO accession.  
Another example of the power of NATO to instigate reforms, even when influential Polish 
political are opposed to them includes the passing of a secrecy act, restricting access to information, 
classified as sensitive. Complaints arose immediately about undue haste and poor drafting including 
the fact that the act was too broad and could potentially undermine the effectiveness of the right-to 
information law passed earlier on in 1999. In addition, Poland’s ombudsman questioned the 
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constitutionality of rules in the country’s new Classified Information Act. Poland’s judges also 
complained about intrusive investigations to determine whether their lifestyles could make them 
“susceptible to . . . pressure.”
55 The Polish government claimed that their legislation is tailored to 
suit NATO requirements. However, irrespectively of whether the government is using the process of 
NATO expansion as a pretext for adopting unnecessarily broad laws or whether NATO’s 
requirements are unduly biased against transparency, the act does allow cabinets to hide from public 
scrutiny by invoking the secrecy clauses. 
In addition, NATO provided Polish officials with technical information about the 
consequences of alternative policies. To call the efficacy of Territorial Defense into question, NATO 
provided its multiple strategic assessment of the post-Cold War security environment in Europe, 
according to which threats come from the European periphery in the form of serious economic, 
social, and political instabilities.
56 The Territorial Defense debate was also couched in terms of 
spending priorities and whether Poland could afford the policy in addition to allowing sufficient 
resources to NATO’s arrangements.  NATO officials argued that every defense dollar should be 
spent on NATO-capable forces referring back to their strategic assessment.  In other words, NATO 
provided the reasons for the reversal of the policy, so the national governments could then “begin a 
process of explaining the reasons for change to their publics.” 
57  In the civil-military relations case, 
the alliance also supplied Polish state elites with a detailed interpretation of “the meaning” (NATO’s 
understanding) of civilian authority. In numerous meetings between NATO and Polish officials and 
through PfP NATO informed Polish civilians about the necessity and benefits of balanced civil-
military relations, so the Poles were could articulate that logic at the domestic level.  
In brief, NATO helped change the informational status quo in Poland. The alliance made 
available to the population and the Polish elite a vast array of information about the “deficiencies” of 
Polish civilian authority or the benefits of the NATO-inspired alternative defense policies.  This 
technical information was supplemented with political information about the preferences of Poland’s 
Western allies on defense matters. Because of the military prestige of the alliance and the 
democratic experience of the West, the information provided by NATO weighed a lot and helped 
mobilize support. With few exceptions Polish journalists and commentators were incapable of 
probing into technical defense issues, and no private organizations were available to scrutinize the 
details of military policies
58. So the organization also supplied NATO’s report on the progress the 
Polish government had made in reforming defense and security institutions according to the 
alliance’s recommendations. As a result, the public and political elites were able to use NATO’s 
opinion to judge the performance of the Polish governments. This increased the government’s 
accountability in defense and security matters but it also it was also accountability measured against 
the goals of the alliance rather than the preference of the electorate itself. Even if those may have 
coincided in the 1994-1999 period, that shift could potentially be problematic in the long-term.  
 
A.3.4 Impact on Institutions 
In discussions of both civil-military relations and Poland’s defense strategy, NATO’s 
influence was channeled through the executive.  Deputy Minister of Defense Andrzej Karkoszka 
was the principal mediator between NATO officials and the Polish armed forces.  The primary 
responsibility for ties with NATO was delegated to the civilian-led Department of Foreign Military 
Affairs.
59 Not only was the legislature marginalized from the cooperation process but also NATO 
recommendations for improving civilian democratic control of the armed forces addressed the 
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problems within the executive and did not target in any way the weakness of parliamentary 
oversight.  NATO limited its assistance for strengthening domestic control over defense and security 
issues to workshops organized within PfP and the North Atlantic Assembly and meant to spread 
knowledge about the functions of parliamentary defense and security committees and procedures for 
ensuring democratic control of the military. In other words, the institutional channels for the 
participation of domestic groups (either parliament or civil society) were hardly improved.  
 
A.4 Conclusion 
The alliance inspired a lot of positive changes in the Polish defense and security 
institutions.  At NATO’s recommendation, civil-military relations were changed to eliminate direct 
access of the highest-ranking officer to domestic politics.  Another beneficial outcome of this reform 
was strengthening the government’s capacity to exercise control over the armed forces while 
limiting the contestation between the different branches of the executive over defense, security and 
foreign affairs matters.  Moreover, NATO training helped improve the awareness of some 
parliamentarians of the functions of the legislature in ensuring democratic civilian control of the 
armed forces. NATO further supplied information on governmental performance in defense and 
security, which increased elite accountability in domains of importance to the alliance. Finally, by 
ruling out Territorial Defense, NATO prevented the possible militarization of Polish society.   
However, this brief overview of NATO involvement in restructuring Polish defense and 
security institutions also demonstrated that domestic political resources were redistributed mostly in 
favor of the executive. NATO channeled its influence mainly through a compact team of experts 
within the executive. Moreover, NATO-Polish reform efforts focused on bolstering executive, not 
parliamentary control. Polish and NATO enlightened elites came to “guide” Polish citizens in 
choosing a direction for the Polish national defense strategy, which correspondingly limited 
domestic initiative.  By presenting alliance membership as a strategic cultural choice, the NATO-
Polish executive network not only changed the set of legitimate policies to include only a balanced 
type of democratic civilian control but also altered the criteria on which Polish politicians could win 
legitimacy. Polish leaders could no longer opt for challenging NATO prescriptions without penalty. 
While limiting the array of legitimate ideas, NATO structured the Polish domestic debate so the 
country would almost unequivocally comply with the alliance’s propositions. Such incentives (the 
legitimacy of which could be questioned in cases such as Territorial Defense) could become 
extremely problematic for the democratization project of the country, as they contribute to the 
marginalization of parliament as a forum for democratic debate in addition to its already relative 
functional weakness. 
 
B. NATO AND ROMANIA 
B.1 Introduction: Section Outline  
While aiding the Romania’s application for membership into the alliance, NATO had the 
opportunity to influence the country’s reform trajectory.  The alliance was particularly active in the 
civil-military reform and the reorganization of the armed forces. To assess the effects of cooperation 
between NATO and Romania on elite autonomy, I briefly introduce the outlook of defense and 
security institutions prior to NATO involvement.  I then describe the structures of initiative, 
institutions, ideas, and information in terms of the access that both elites and domestic groups have 
to the process of international cooperation. A positive to Romania’s democratization project 
outcome was the further civilianization and transparentization of civil-military relations and the 
improvement of channels for civil society participation and parliament’s oversight abilities.  
However, policy initiation was shifted to the alliance and to some extent to the executive.  Reform 
was promoted primarily though executive acts rather than parliamentary legislation.  Since failure to 
act within the prescriptions of NATO and pro-NATO Romanian reformers was described by those 
officials as a sign that Romania is not a democratic and truly European state, real debate about the   21   
reform process was precluded.  The redistribution of control over domestic political resources in 
favor of the executive led to the marginalization of parliament. 
 
B.2.1 Communist Legacies and Transition Agenda 
Under communism, the alienation between the Romanian military and the Romanian 
communist regime grew, and professional standards deteriorated with time.  It was the army’s rival – 
the Security Police – that received preferential treatment from Bucharest.  The armed forces were 
left poorly provided for.  Because of Bucharest’s reluctant and limited participation in the Warsaw 
Pact, professional standards deteriorated further. Moreover, the Communist Party executed extensive 
and intensive control over the military, so that “politicized” civil-military relations prevailed in 
Romania.  Finally, Ceausescu periodically rotated the top military officials to prevent them from 
building their own powerbases.
60  On the other hand, the relative autonomy of the Romanian military 
from the Warsaw Treaty Organization allowed the army to maintain its public respect both before 
and after the transition.
61  
Due to the particular position Romania held in the former Warsaw Treaty Organization, its 
national defense was configured to be able to respond to a series of multidirectional threats.
62  
Therefore there was little structural adjustment necessary after the end of the Cold War.  However, 
the Romanian military needed to be modernized.  Due to the deterioration of professional standards, 
the armed forces were big, heavy and inefficient, military infrastructure had decayed and 
technologies were largely outdated.  Finally and most importantly, because of the politicization of 
civil-military relations under state-socialism, civilian post-socialist leadership was generally too 
weak to head the modernization of the armed forces or the restructuring of the defense and security 
institutions.  Therefore, the establishment of democratic control over the military and the internal 
security services and the development of transparency in the defense budget
63 became necessary as a 
prerequisite for the modernization of the Romanian armed forces.   
 
B.2.2 Security and Defense Institutions before NATO involvement 
The 1991 Constitution entrusted Parliament with providing the legal framework for the 
functioning of the defense institutions and holding the executive branch and the military accountable 
for their actions.  The legislature was given the right of interpellation. Four committees overseeing 
defense issues were created within the parliament.  The Constitution also delegated to Parliament the 
right to ratify partial mobilizations, declarations of war and the suspension of armed hostilities.  
With the Defense Law of January 1991, the Ministry of National Defense became the central 
executive organ for defense issues.  The minister was made accountable to the government for all 
the ministry’s activities and also, as a member of the government, to parliament.  Finally, the 
president was selected as the Commander-in-Chief of the Romanian army.  As such, he chairs the 
Supreme National Defense Council.  Council members include the leaders of the pertinent ministries 
and governmental agencies.  Yet, the Council has no legal-constitutional authority.   
The broad decision-making powers of the executive branch are further increased in practice.  
The delayed passing of additional legislation, necessary to determine the division of responsibilities 
between the executive power and the legislature, undermined the transparency, accountability, and 
legal regulation of security and defense matters.  On the one hand, very few of the members of the 
committees in either chamber or any independent institutions had any expertise in those issues.
64  On 
the other hand, President Ion Iliescu has tried to obstruct attempts by parliamentary committees to 
                                                 
60 Barany, “Democratic Consolidation and the Military,” p. 24. 
61 Jeffrey Simon, “Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and East Europe,” Strategic Forum, 172 (June 2000). 
62 The Officer (October, 2000). 
63 King Michael of Romania GCVO, “Romania and NATO: The Time for Real Partnership,” RUSI Journal (April 1997): 6-
11. 
64 Alexandra Gheciu, Security as Community?: NATO and the Politics of State-Crafting in Post-Cold War Central and 
Eastern Europe (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 2001), p. 277.   22   
establish control over the military and the police.  He used the presidential power to vest himself in 
increasing authority to ensure that the army will protect the regime from its internal opponents.
65  
Iliescu further made and effort to establish his powerbase in the military by interfering in personnel 
matters.
66   
In brief, prior to NATO involvement in Romania in 1994, the Romanian civil-military 
relations could be qualified as vertical type. The Minister of Defense is the highest-ranking military 
official, who oversees the entire defense establishment and controls the administrative personnel.  
This model is largely inconsistent with stable civilian control over the military because of the direct 
access of the officer to the executive.  Furthermore, due to institutional and practical limitations, 
parliamentary and societal control over defense and security was extremely weak. 
 
B.3 Impact of NATO-Romania Cooperation Practices  
The formal cooperation between NATO and Romania began with Romania’s application to 
the Partnership for Peace Program in January 1994.  The purpose of PfP has been to foster a close 
CEE-NATO working relationship oriented toward transparency in defense budgeting, promoting 
democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and interoperability 
with NATO forces in peace-keeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations.
67  Over 800 
Romanians graduated PfP courses for military officers and civilians from ministries of defense and 
ministries of foreign affairs of the former socialist block.  The courses aimed at achieving normative 
and military interoperability in addressing various problems of domestic and international stability.  
In addition, hundreds of Romanians participated in over a hundred seminars and workshops 
organized within the North Atlantic Assembly under the Rose-Roth initiative.  They sought to 
diffuse knowledge about the functions of parliamentary defense and security committees and 
procedures for ensuring democratic control of the military.
68   Together with on-going interactions 
between permanent NATO members and associate delegations from PfP countries, these activities 
created a link for Romanian parliamentarians to interact with their counterparts from NATO 
member-states.
69 All those measures intended to improve the ability of CEE societies to exercise 
control over defense and security.  
Outside the PfP framework, the cooperation between NATO and Romania was aimed at 
promoting reforms of the defense and security institutions, so that Romania would satisfy NATO 
membership criteria, as outlined by the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement and the Perry 
Principles.
70 When NATO decision-makers reviewed Romania’s candidacy before the 1997 Madrid 
Summit, it appeared that the country had taken important steps toward the democratization of its 
defense and security institutions but substantial reforms had yet to be implemented.  While actively 
                                                 
65 As the head of the Supreme Council the president calls to order and controls the coordination of the cooperation between 
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Inferior for “ the maintenance and restoration of legal order.” President Iliescu has used 
the military on several domestic occasions between 1990 and 1991.  Because the military resisted/resists such interferences 
and the public supports its neutrality, the army’s role in domestic life has declined. (See, Robert D. Kaplan, “The Fulcrum of 
Europe,” The Atlantic Monthly, 282.3 (Sep 1998): 28-36)     
66 Zoltan Barany, “Democratic Consolidation and the Military,” p. 33-34. 
67 NATO, “Partnership for Peace: Invitation,” press communiqué M- I (94) 2, meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO 
headquarters, Brussels, January 10-11, 1994. 
68 In 2000, Romania has participated in over 300 NATO/PfP activities, including 15 military exercises, and over 470 
bilateral cooperation activities with 18 Allies and 15 Partner countries.  Various training institutions have been established 
with bilateral assistance; Enhanced sub-regional co-operation at a bilateral, trilateral and multilateral level concentrating on 
priority areas of common interest and concrete projects.  Active participation in the dialogue and exchange of experience 
with the other aspirant countries included in the Membership Action Plan.  See, http://domino.kappa.ro/mae/dosare.nsf. 
69 Gheciu, Security as Community? p. 290. 
70 In addition, a privileged framework of cooperation at governmental level has been created for the bilateral relations with 
some countries in the Alliance, by establishing strategic partnerships with multiple dimensions, namely political, economic 
and military, such as is the case with the US, France and Italy.  (Anca Visan, “Romania's Path to NATO--One Romanian 
View,” NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace, 3 (2002), p. 28; Anonymous, “Romanian Armed Forces' Bilateral Relations 
with NATO Members,” NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace, 3 (2002): 43-45)   23   
preparing the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for assuming NATO membership in 1999, the 
Alliance encountered unexpected difficulties, which called for re-evaluation of the cooperation 
practices.
71  At the Washington Summit in April 1999, NATO once again mentioned Romania as a 
country within enlargement plans, and most importantly came up with a resolution to become more 
deeply involved in CEE restructuring.  This commitment led to institutional changes such as the 
endorsement of an expanded and adapted PfP, a more comprehensive and institutionalized Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council, and Membership Action Plan (MAP).  MAP included the submission 
of Annual National Plan by each candidate, a comprehensive system for monitoring and feedback to 
aspirant countries, assessment meetings in the North Atlantic Council, and systematic consultation 
and workshops between candidates and NATO teams in each of the areas of the Annual National 
Plan, enhanced defense planning that establishes and reviews agreed planning targets, and a 
clearinghouse for coordinating security assistance.
72  Three years into the Membership Action Plan, 
at the Prague Summit in November 21-22, 2002, Romania was invited to begin Accession Talks 
with NATO.   
 
B.3.1 Impact on Initiative 
NATO and Romanian elites “guided” the Romanian citizens in choosing a direction for their 
defense and security institutions.  After the Romanian revolution of 1989, a neo-communist 
leadership under President Ion Iliescu’s guiding hand began leading Romania’s post-socialist 
democratic transition.  Iliescu pressed to gain legitimacy for his regime through access to Western 
institutions and funding.
73  As early as July 1990, Romania invited NATO's Secretary General 
Manfred Worner to visit Romania and proposed the accreditation of a Romanian Ambassador to 
NATO.  Although officially unresponsive to Romania’s interest in a partner relationship with 
NATO, the alliance preferred to see Romania aspire to the Western democratic world than to stall or 
reverse the transition.  President Ion Iliescu formulated Euro-Atlantic integration as a main objective 
of Romania’s foreign policy, despite a striking disagreement over this goal among Romanian 
political elites.
74 It was President Iliescu who built some consensus among Romania's political 
parties around Romania’s full integration with Euro-Atlantic economic and military institutions.
75 
In sum, in the period between 1990 and 1996, the Iliescu circle and NATO officials 
cooperatively produced Romania’s interest in joining the alliance.  It should be mentioned, however, 
that NATO was less involved in the formulation of Romania’s aspirations to join the alliance, than it 
was in Poland.  Because that interest in integration in the Euro-Atlantic area was established from 
above despite the disagreement among Romanian political elites, NATO had to further rely on the 
executive to initiate defense policies, so that they would be compatible with the alliance’s own.  
After 1996, Romanian policy-makers accepted most of the “recommendations” made by 
their Western counterparts but tended to present those as the result of their own efforts.
76  Similarly, 
when in 1999 Romanian-decision makers asked Western advisers to become directly involved in 
identifying national priorities in the area of defense and security and to formulate strategies for the 
achievement of those priorities, this invitation was presented as a step that was initiated by 
Bucharest rather than being “result of subtle modes of international social influence.”
77 Thus in early 
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1999 a NATO associate-general became the de facto main author of the Romanian Annual National 
Program chapter that deals with security issues.  Moreover he was the one who presented the plan to 
NATO’s North Atlantic Council in the spring of 1999 and received feedback on behalf of 
Romania.
78   In brief, not only was the Romanian defense reform agenda composed by NATO and 
Romanian officials together – even if legitimacy dictated its presentation as purely Romanian – but 
after 1999 NATO acquired the power to participate in crafting basic institutions of the Romanian 
state through Romania’s National Programs and security legislation.   
In addition to accepting permanent Western advisers in key ministries, in 1999, the 
Romanian executive created special departments within the various relevant executive agencies 
dedicated exclusively to NATO and PfP related activities.  These departments were also united 
under an Interdepartmental Commission for NATO Integration.
79  The operation of the Commission 
strengthens and increases the Romanian - NATO executive network.  Through the Commission, 
NATO provides the Romanians with new ”correct” ideas and information.  NATO’s suggestions are 
picked up and rearticulated by the pro-(NATO)reform officials within the Romanian circles as 
reforms, legitimized by NATO’s experience and authority in defense issues.  The creation of the 
Commission not only provides a forum for building consensus within the executive around reforms 
advocated by NATO advisers but also allows NATO to monitor executive activities.   
In conclusion, cooperation with NATO influenced the authority to introduce or block the 
introduction of defense and security legislation. By working closely with the executive in composing 
the defense and security reform agenda, the alliance shifted domestic initiative toward the alliance 
and to some extent the executive. Since NATO recommendations became preconditions for 
membership, defense and security matters were internalized as Euro-Atlantic integration issues 
rather than treated as a part of the external policy process, which effectively reduced domestic 
control over and initiative in those issues. 
 
B.3.2 Impact on Ideas  
The alliance used its enormous political and cultural power to change the set of ideas that 
Romanians regarded as legitimate.  On the one hand, pro-NATO Romanian elites and the alliance 
itself described the adoption of liberal political and economic institutions as Romania’s road to 
peace and prosperity.
80 On the other hand, these officials established in Romania the Western 
discourse that NATO is not just an alliance but also an embodiment of the western community of 
these liberal values and norms.
81 Pro-NATO Romanian elites insisted that Romania, as a country 
with “democratic, liberal and humanist values,” should seek inclusion in that community (“Europe, 
and by extension “the Western structures”).
82 This not only sanctioned the notion that membership in 
NATO is a cultural and identity choice, but also led Romanians to invite NATO officials to play key 
– if not intrusive – roles in the process of western-style democratization of the defense and security 
institutions.  Through NATO officials and through (pro-NATO) Romanian executives re-articulating 
the alliance’s position, the organization delineated the normative foundation of the Romanian 
defense and security institutions.  Just as in the Polish case, Romanian policy-makers could not 
question the consensus, created by the reformers and NATO officials without compromising their 
observing of the Romanian national interest. Hence, little debate about either NATO integration or 
NATO-initiated reforms occurred. 
By banking on Romania’s aspirations to the West – and thus indirectly to peace and 
prosperity – and to NATO’s power to punish and reward Romania in those terms (aspirations), the 
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NATO-Romanian executive network redefined the already established norms and reformulated pre-
existing Romanian tradition.  The idea of security as protecting Romanian territorial integrity from 
external threats was substituted with the objective of achieving good neighbor relations and regional 
stability.  Furthermore, the nature of the civil authority over the armed forces was changed to reflect 
balanced civil-military relations and steps were taken to enhance societal control in defense and 
security institutions. 
 
B.3.2.1 Security Threats, Sovereignty and Good Neighborhood Treaties 
The socialist and nationalist political elites in power before 1996 stated their support for 
Euro-Atlantic Integration but they also emphasized the need to preserve Romania’s sovereignty. 
Integral part of the election platform of a 1992 election winner
83 was built around the possible 
Hungarian (and to some extent Russian) threat to Romanian integrity and the portrayal of Western 
institutions as potential sources of danger to Romanian sovereignty.
84  Not only did the alliance try 
to persuade the Cabinet that the only way to domestic security and prosperity is the adoption of 
democratic institutions, but NATO also made clear that such reforms would improve Romania’s 
standing in the international community, facilitate access to funding and improve the country’s 
chances of getting into NATO (sticks and carrots).  President Iliescu was compelled to take steps to 
improve relations with Hungary.  They culminated in the conclusion of a Good Neighborhood 
Treaty with Hungary in 1996.
85 Again, after similar encouragement from NATO, Romania's second 
post-communist President Constantinescu signed and ratified a basic Romanian-Ukrainian Treaty in 
time for the 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid.
 86 
The conclusion of Good Neighborhood Treaties especially with Hungary and Ukraine are 
significant in two respects: they make provisions for guaranteeing minority rights and they 
demonstrate that Romania has redefined its national security threat perceptions.  This redefinition – 
even if in contrast with the sentiments of the population at large
87 – was undertaken because NATO 
did not accept territorial rivalries and neighborhood grudges as legitimate security risks. The alliance 
insisted on an even more explicit synchronizing of the Romanian threat perception with NATO’s 
threat assessments.  In 1999 NATO advisers persuaded Romanian officials to pass a new National 
Security Strategy, which states that there is no major military threat to the country’s security
88 and 
assigns the Romanian military “the protection and promotion of Romania’s national interests 
abroad.”
89 Correspondingly, Rapid Reaction Forces for out-of-area operations were created and 
Romanian armed forces were reduced.
90  Moreover, Western officials convinced Romanians that 
since the National Security Strategy acknowledged that threats were coming from potential internal 
socio-economic instability, an intergovernmental body – the Interdepartmental Commission for 
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NATO Integration – should be formed by representatives from ministries of labor, interior, industry, 
transportation and finance to cooperate with ministry of defense in the formulation and 
implementation of future legislation in the area of defense.
91 Thus, Romania was compelled to 
change its security perceptions according to the tradition of the community of democratic states, to 
which Romania was aspiring. 
Finally, during the Kosovo crisis of 1999, NATO “persuaded” the Romanian government 
that “true commitment to liberal-democratic norms was inconsistent with failure to act in support of 
the West.”
 92  NATO pointed out that other democratic nations supported allied action and suggested 
that, “it was time for Romania and its neighbors to show whether their political reorientation 
towards Western liberal-democracy was real or merely rhetorical.”
93  However, Romanian policy-
makers were concerned about the possibility that Yugoslavia might retaliate either directly or on the 
Romanian minority in Yugoslavia.  In addition, Russia was exercising considerable pressure on 
Bucharest warning that alignment with the West might have adverse consequences on the 
Romanian-Russian relations.  About 78% of the population was opposed to the military operations.  
But because of the international pressure, at the end, Romania took concrete steps in support of the 
West: it allowed unlimited use of Romanian airspace, accepted refugees, and sent troops as a 
member of PfP.   
In sum, NATO and Romanian officials limited the set of legitimate ideas that formed the 
base of the Romanian National Security Strategy.  They successfully delegitimized the idea of threat 
to Romanian territorial integrity.  Instead, they put to the fore the theme of good neighbor relations 
and a change from classical territorial defense to the protection and promotion of Romania’s 
national interests abroad.  This was largely done at the executive level where the National Security 
Strategy was formulated.  However, when introducing security issues in parliament, as in the 
Kosovo crisis case, both the Romanian decision-makers and the alliance framed their justification in 
a value-based discourse.  They explained that failure to cooperate with NATO and act like member-
states might lead the West to place Romania in “the camp of non-civilized people.”
 94 Given 
Romanians’ desire for peace and prosperity, emblematized by Euro-Atlantic integration, such 
rhetoric effectively delegitimized alternative actions, and again created a superficial consensus like 
in the Polish case.   
 
B.3.2.2 Civil-Military Relations  
NATO also worked closely with Romania on its reforms in the area of civil-military 
relations – establishment of transparency and accountability of defense institutions, limited and 
clearly defined mandates of the different agencies that govern defense-related decision-making, 
civilianization of the ministries of defense and interior, and the empowerment of civil society vis-à-
vis the state.   
It was only in 1994 and under international pressure that a law on the organization of the 
Romanian Ministry of National Defense was passed.  Trying to burnish Romania’s candidacy for 
PfP, Iliescu’s Cabinet proposed the appointment of a civilian minister of defense in the hope that 
cosmetic changes would be sufficient for Western diplomatic support.  Even though in 1994 the first 
civilian minister of defense was appointed, the Ministry of National Defense below him remained 
almost devoid of civilians.  The minister of defense and the highest-ranking military official had 
practically the same duties with administrative personnel responsible to the highest-ranking military 
officer.  Again the highest-ranking military officer oversaw the entire defense establishment but was 
formally subordinated to the civilian.  This model was seen as problematic in regard to stable 
civilian control because of the immense authority in the hands of the highest-ranking officer.  
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However, it still was a step in the direction of the democratization of Romanian civil-military 
relations, because the officer’s direct access to the executive was taken away.  
The alliance did not accept Romania’s vertical civil-military relations as legitimate 
democratic civilian control.  In dialogues with Romanian decision-makers from the new pro-
Western government in 1997-1998 and with the appointment of permanent advisers from NATO 
member-states to the Ministry of Defense in Bucharest, the West pressured Bucharest to balance 
civil-military relations.  The first step was taken with the discontinuation of practices of better 
benefits for military staff and of the abuse of a heavily politicized system of selection and 
promotion.
95 Additionally, in 1999, the government passed two resolutions, which promulgated the 
reorganization of the Ministry of Defense, advocated by NATO.  
Moreover, NATO officials and Romanian reformers also worked together to have 
Romanians move away from the hierarchical and exclusionary governance in defense matters. At 
NATO recommendation, a new system was created to enable societal actors to become more deeply 
involved in policy-making and policy-implementation in the area of defense and security.  It requires 
the ministry of defense to inform and cooperate on a permanent basis with other ministries and 
departments, the parliament, as well as with societal actors.  In addition, the Interdepartmental 
Commission for Integration into NATO is to also consult with the military and other social actors in 
order to take advantage of the expertise of societal agencies in the area of defense and security.
96   
In conclusion, NATO changed not only the nature of the civil-military relations but also the 
state structure by enhancing societal control with improving venues for civil society participation.  
NATO delegitimized the nature of the repressive Romanian state, by compelling the Romanians to 
reform the Ministry of Interior and better protect the civil and political rights of Romanians.  To 
change the set of ideas that Romanians regarded as legitimate, the alliance used its authority and 
vast experience in those spheres.  NATO drew its own legitimacy from its image of the embodiment 
of the community of western liberal democracies, whose experience and evolution it represented.  
The alliance transferred its legitimacy to its partners in the NATO-Romanian executive network.  
Since Romania is aspiring to be a part of that community, it should, NATO and those Romanians 
insisted, also adopt these norms and values and implement the changes that the more experienced 
NATO recommended.  Thus, NATO precluded any alternative arrangements or debates about them.  
Parliament was marginalized because it was excluded from the process of establishing the 
ideological underpinnings of Romanian defense and security arrangements, a role that was assumed 
by NATO advisers.   
 
B.3.3 Impact on Domestic Institutions  
Both PfP and later MAP involve parliamentarians from CEE in different activities meant to 
educate the CEE Members of Parliament about the functions of parliaments in ensuring democratic 
civilian control in defense and security matters.  Furthermore, it should be noted that MAP 
introduced the participation of representatives of parliament in a few of the workshops and required 
that individual partnership programs be ratified by parliament.  However, NATO’s influence was 
channeled mainly through the executive. Since it was through this cooperation that the restructuring 
of defense and security institutions was performed, national parliaments have been marginalized in 
those state-building processes. Given the ideational constraints established by the alliance (discussed 
in the previous section) and the limited opportunities for the parliament’s participation in the 
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formulation of national security doctrines, it can be concluded that national democratic forums have 
been marginalized in the cooperation process between NATO and Romania.  
Even more importantly, parliaments were denied the opportunity to exercise control over or 
modify the content of the decisions of the executive network of NATO and Polish officials: after 
1996, in Romania, cooperation with NATO constrained the activity of domestic legislative authority, 
since reform was furthered through executive acts rather than parliamentary legislation (Figure.1).  
Even if NATO officials did not propose the use governmental resolutions, they tacitly agreed to it. 
 
Figure 1. National Defense: Legislative Framework in Romania 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK  
of national defense contributing to the military system reform and organization:  
1.  Law no.  45 / 1994 on the national defense of Romania; 
2.  Law no.  73 / 1995 on national economy and territory preparation for defense; 
3.  Law no.  80 / 1995 on military personnel status;  
4.  Law no.  46 / 1996 on preparing the population for defense;  
5.  Law no.  106 / 1996 on civil protection; 
6.  Law no.  132 / 1997 on goods and public services requisitions for public interest;  
7.  Government Decision no.  618 / 1997 on alternative military service;  
8.  Government Ordinance no.  7 / 1998 on measures for the civil protection of the personnel 
during the MoND restructuring process;  
9.  Government Resolution no.  52 / 1998 on defense planning;  
10.  Government Resolution no.  121 / 1998 on material responsibility of the military personnel, 
approved by the Law no.  25 / 1999; 
11.  Urgency Government Resolution no.  1 / 1999 on the state of siege and emergency;  
12.  Government Resolution no.  385 / 1999 on MoND organization; 
13.  Government Resolution no.  41 / 1999 on MoND organization and function. 
 Source: Romanian Ministry of National Defense 
 
NATO officials were eager to have the Romanians redefine the role of Romanian security 
institutions and the meaning of democratic civilian authority over the armed forces.  However, 
progress in the reform process achieved through executive acts rather than parliamentary legislation 
led to the further marginalization of domestic democratic forums.  It altered the functioning of 
domestic institutions, setting a precedent that the executive not only initiates but also passes defense 
and security legislation.  The redistribution of control over domestic political resources in favor of 
the executive not only did not address the weakness of parliamentary oversight in Romania but 
exacerbated it.  
 
B.3.4 Information Distribution 
It was through the skillful use of information that NATO and (pro-NATO) Romanian 
reformers achieved the already described sweeping reforms of the Romanian defense and security 
institutions.  NATO and (pro-NATO) Romanian officials modified the domestic distribution of 
political and technical knowledge.   
Political information about the preferences and power of different actors was the most used 
cognitive instrument.  In the period before 1996, President Iliescu used his personal authority and 
manipulated the remnants of the communist political culture of “following the leader and his orders” 
to set Euro-Atlantic Integration as a foreign policy priority in Romania.  On NATO’s side, the 
alliance confronted Iliescu with information about its preferences and about the carrots and sticks 
the organization was willing to use to compel Romania to behave in the direction recommended by 
the alliance.  The alliance was successful in getting Iliescu to take steps to improve Romania’s 
relations with at least Hungary and at least appoint civilian minister of defense.     29   
In the post-1996 period, the most used cognitive means was political information about 
NATO’s power and preferences, which was distributed at different levels in Romania.  To mobilize 
Romanian executives around liberal norms, NATO officials interpreted for them the alliance’s 
expectations down to the specific details about what Romania’s institutions and behavior should 
be.
97 In numerous consultations, through the Intergovernmental Commission on NATO Integration 
and in the “Report on the Evolution of Romanian Politics of Security, “
98 the alliance provided 
guidelines for the “necessary” (according to NATO) reforms.  This tradition was institutionalized 
through the MAP’s comprehensive system for monitoring and feedback to aspirant countries and 
assessment meetings in the North Atlantic Council.  This information was expected to be passed on 
to other policy-makers and the general public either in the form of internalized agenda or again as 
NATO’s political preference, i.e. as the preference of any liberal democracy and therefore of 
Romania, as well.   
Often times, NATO officials or/and pro-NATO Romanian reformers would inform the 
public about the West’s dissatisfaction with the progress of reforms in Romania to mobilize support 
for the speedy continuation of reforms.  For instance, US Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, told 
Romanians during a visit to Romania in late 1999 that their country had to demonstrate that it is 
security provider not just consumer.
99 Similarly, in a White House meeting between the then 
Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea and Vice President Al Gore, the US reportedly offered 
explicit though non-public assurances to Bucharest, that Romania will be accepted in the second 
round of NATO enlargement.  However, Gore’s assurances also came with a caveat that Romania 
pursues the road it started.
100 Often times NATO’s criticism of the work of the Romanian 
government increased the government’s accountability to some extent but just as in the Polish case, 
the long-term consequences of the shift in responsiveness might be still unclear. Telling is the 
adoption of the secrecy law in Romania – a law, which according to the International Helsinki 
Federation failed to strike a proper balance between secrecy and the public’s right to know in 
allowing for “incredibly broad” restrictions that could “substantially undermine” the new right-to-
information statute. A colonel of the Romanian Intelligence Service “came down like a storm on the 
members of the Senate Juridical Commission” telling them that Brussels informed them that unless 
the bill is passed within two weeks, they cannot exclude adopting a critical attitude regarding 
Romania. The senators understood the “huge problems” Romania might face unless they pass the 
bill as soon as possible and approved the draft bill in the form passed by the Chamber of Deputies.
101 
Political information about NATO’s power and preference was used at the implementation 
stage, as well.  In several separate cases long-delayed reforms within different ministries were 
finally passed because of NATO’s intervention, acting on request of (pro-NATO) Romanian 
reformers
102.  Because of the thinness of Romanian public debate on defense and security issues and 
the resultant superficial consensus about the reform agenda in those areas, the implementation of the 
reforms suggested by the alliance and promulgated by the (pro-NATO) executives often lacked the 
necessary wide support.  For example, the reduction of the military required the cooperation of the 
Ministry of Labor.  In 1999, the Ministry of Labor was still delaying the creation of retraining and 
replacement programs, so a couple of pro-reform members of the ministry of defense asked NATO 
to intervene.  A senior member of the Political Affairs of NATO’s international staff called one of 
the bureaucrats at the ministry of labor and “allegedly told him: ‘NATO wants to see this done.  Do 
you think you can do it?’” Soon after, the Ministry of Labor began the creation of such programs.
103  
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Similar action was used frequently to further reform in the Ministry of Defense, when the 
bureaucracy stalled the process.  Western officials informed those bureaucrats that “NATO 
required” that particular program.  
Finally, to mobilize broader support amongst parliamentarians and military officers, NATO 
used technical information about defense and security institutions in liberal democracies.  Through 
various workshops in PfP, MAP and the Rose-Roth Initiative, the alliance disbursed information that 
aimed to improve understanding among legislators of their various problems and perspectives; to 
familiarize legislators with key security and defense issues; to promote the development of 
appropriate civil-military relations, including the democratic control of armed forces; to share 
expertise and experience in parliamentary practice and procedures.  In other words NATO sought to 
disseminate a particular, Western-defined, set of understandings that were a “desirable” or “better” 
alternative to the Romanian defense and security institutions. 
 
B.4 Conclusion 
Acting under NATO’s guidance, Romanian reformers have enacted new legal and 
institutional arrangements in the security realm.  NATO involvement legitimized particular 
meanings of liberal-democratic practices and institutions and discredited alternative interpretations.  
In conformity with NATO’s definition of democratic control and contrary to the view previously 
held by Romanians, the 1999 reform on Romanian security institutions established a balanced type 
of civil-military relations, which maximized the prospects for professionalization of the armed 
forces and civilian control over them.  Romania also took steps to broaden the meaning of defense 
and security institutions to include institutions governing the domestic order like Ministry of 
Interior.
104 After cooperating with NATO, Romanians accepted the further civilianization and 
transparentization of all defense institutions and improved venues for civil society and public 
participation.  NATO successfully compelled Romania to implement a national security strategy 
based on the assessment that Romanian security can only be based on building good neighbor 
relations and the promotion of Romania’s national interests in the region.   
These positive and important changes came at the cost of marginalizing domestic 
democratic forums.  NATO took steps to build parliament’s ability to oversee defense and security 
matters, but parliament was hardly involved in the reorganization of the defense and security 
institutions. The formulation of the role of Romanian security institutions and the meaning of 
democratic civilian authority over the armed forces was coordinated between NATO and pro-NATO 
executives.  The institutionalization of these redefined roles was achieved through executive acts 
rather than parliamentary legislation.  Thus not only was much of the initiative passed to the alliance 
and the executive but also it was the government that passed defense and security regulations. Since 
failure to cooperate with NATO and act like member-states was presented by NATO and pro-NATO 
Romanian reformers as a sign that Romania was not a democratic and truly European state, real 
debate about the reform process was precluded.  The redistribution of control over domestic political 
resources in favor of the executive not only did not address the weakness of parliamentary oversight 
in Romania but also exacerbated it.  The legislature effectively lost its right to contribute to and 
oversee defense and security matters. 
The implications of these practices can be twofold.  On the one hand, because reforms were 
promoted by an executive network, often there were problems of implementation.  Especially if 
reforms depended on a broad array of institutional and societal actors, pro-reform actors had 
difficulty mustering the level of support required for norm implementation.
105 On the other hand, 
such practices might have established a tradition of greater elite autonomy that might prove difficult 
to reverse. 
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EU INVOLVEMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE 
1.  Introduction 
This section of the study addresses the specific case of the EU’s impact on curbing elite 
autonomy in Poland and Romania.  The analysis begins with a brief overview of the historical 
development of the relations between CEEC and the European Community or European Union after 
1993.  Then the chapter proceeds with a discussion about the impact of the institutionalization of the 
CEEC-EU cooperation on the distribution of domestic resources in both Romania and Poland.  One 
of the conclusions of this section is that the lack of real debate on European integration in both 
CEECs reflects a thin consensus on accession but also little or belated awareness of the details of the 
legislation that parliaments are passing.
106 Domestic debate is additionally constrained by the 
CEECs’ obligation to adopt the White Paper and the acquis communitaire, which shift policy 
initiation towards the EU.  Parliaments’ legislative and oversight power is further limited by the 
agreement to fast-track procedures for EU regulation.  Moreover, the institutions created to manage 
CEEC-EU cooperation were established within the executive, thus empowering it with the colossal 
and important obligations of managing the integration process.  The conclusion raises some possible 
problems stemming from the marginalization of democratic forums.   
 
2.  Historical Context  
With the advent of Perestroika in the Soviet block, the European community received the 
opportunity to engage in direct and formal negotiations with individual CEECs.  In 1989 bilateral 
agreements on trade and economic cooperation were concluded with Poland, Hungary, and the 
Soviet Union but trade cooperation and aid assistance became conditional on further CEEC 
commitments to political transformation
107.  The EC’s role in providing external encouragement and 
support for domestic economic reform was additionally strengthened since the Commission was 
given the responsibility to coordinate aid from several international financial institutions and G24.
108 
The EC/EU began administering the PHARE Program (Poland, Hungary: Assistance for Economic 
Reconstructuring) and some limited bilateral aid.
 109   Even though Romania had cooperated with the 
West since the 1970s, concern over the Romanian government’s limited progress with political and 
economic reform led to Romania’s initial exclusion from PHARE and one-year delay in the 
negotiations of a trade agreement. 
The deterioration of economic conditions in the years immediately after the beginning of the 
CEE transition necessitated adjustment of the 1989 agreements.  Initial negotiations for what came 
to be known as the Europe Agreements with Poland (and Hungary and Czechoslovakia) started in 
December 1990.
 110  Poland wanted the new agreement to be a transitional agreement towards full 
membership but only in April 1991 a reluctant Council agreed to a preamble that referred to 
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membership as an eventual but certainly not automatic outcome of association.
 111 Romania too 
requested an upgraded agreement and in 1993 signed one but without the reference to membership.  
In the early 1990s, the EC/EU was reluctant to enlarge and prioritized internal integration.  
CEECs were precluded from a speedy membership if only since the EU became busy deepening not 
widening and since with further internal EU integration, accession to the EC/EU became more 
complex.
112 Yet, even if no political rights were assigned to correspond to CEECs economic 
responsibilities, the Europe Agreements created the legal framework for multilateral cooperation 
that would bring CEE closer to the political, socioeconomic and legal frameworks of the EC/EU.  
Furthermore, with adding political elements (adhering to democracy and enforcing human rights) to 
the essentially economic/trading nature of previous agreements, the EU sought to relate political, 
legal, administrative, and economic change in the partner countries to future EU-CEEC relations.
113  
At the 1993 Copenhagen Summit, the European Council publicly conceded the possibility of 
membership for associated CEECs as soon as they became able to assume the obligations of 
membership by satisfying a set of political and economic conditions: stability of institutions like 
democracy, rule of law, human and minority rights; functioning market economy; and the capacity 
to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union and to take on membership 
obligations, such as the European Monetary Union and the Common Security and Foreign Policy. 
The 1994 Essen Council launched a Pre-accession Strategy to bring these countries closer to the 
European Union, taking into account their needs and with the ultimate aim of providing the 
associated countries with an appropriate way of preparing for their accession to the Union. The two 
principle instruments devised as part of this strategy were a 'structured dialogue' between the 
associated states and the Union and the 'European Agreements,' the preparation of the Associated 
States for integration into the Union's internal market.  The Essen Council also requested that the 
European Commission prepare a White Paper defining membership obligations in terms of the 
acquis communitaire – the laws and rules adopted on the basis of the EU's founding treaties.  
To speed up Poland’s integration into the European community, the government announced 
a “Programme of Measures for Adapting the Polish Economy and Legal System to the Requirements 
of the Europe Agreement” and published annual progress reports on the adjustments.  Poland also 
submitted its official application for membership on April 8, 1994.  In June 1995 with full backing 
from parliament, Romania also applied for membership.  Since it had established new legal and 
institutional frameworks to implement the Europe Agreement and had made some efforts to continue 
domestic reforms and to improve relations with its neighbors, Romania was included in the Pre-
accession strategy multilateral cooperation.  The EU’s commitment to enlargement was carefully 
designed to encourage further reform in Romania by reassuring it that it would not be left out: the 
1995 Madrid Council agreed that negotiations would take place simultaneously for all the applicants 
on the basis of common criteria. The European Commission was to proceed with preparing Agenda 
2000 – a detailed review of the candidates’ applications, a broader analysis of the impact of 
enlargement on existing EU budgetary and policy arrangements, and a composite pre-accession and 
accession strategy.  
The Commission’s opinion of the candidates’ applications was published in 1997.  At its 
recommendation, in December 1997 the European Council adopted the Reinforced Pre-accession 
Strategy to enable all the applicant states to become members of the European Union and, to this 
end, to bring them into line as far as possible with the Union's acquis before accession. The new 
Strategy combined the Union's various forms of support into a single framework (Accession 
Partnerships) and familiarized the applicants with the Union's policies and procedures by offering 
them the opportunity to take part in Community programmes.  The Partnership document listed 
short-term (1998) and medium-term (2002) priorities for action and financial support from the EU.  
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Individual Accession Partnerships were negotiated with all applicants and regular reviews on their 
progress in meeting membership criteria were prepared annually.  Poland, which had been screening 
both pre-existing legislation and new draft statutes for compatibility with the EU acquis, quickly 
prepared “National Strategy for Integration” summarizing the measures taken up date and 
formulating the priorities for the adjustment process, together with a schedule of measures to adapt 
the Polish legal system. The country also worked out a draft  “Programme of Preparation for 
Membership in the EU’ to implement the EU priorities.
114 Romania too designed a national strategy, 
meant to prepare the country for membership.  
In 1998 the EU started bilateral discussions with all the candidates but opened formal 
accession negotiations with only five of them, Poland included. Accession talks with Poland were 
concluded at the Copenhagen European Council on 13 December 2002. The Accession Treaty was 
signed with Poland on 16 April 2003 at the Athens European Council with a view to full EU 
membership on 1 May 2004.  With the start of bilateral negotiations with the EU, Romania adopted 
a “National Strategy for the Preparation of Romania's Accession to the EU”, which marked the 
procedural steps and the actions to be undertaken in the process of closing the gap with the 
Community's structures rather than rapid entry. The Helsinki European Council summit in 
December 1999 decided that negotiations for accession with Romania (and Bulgaria) would start in 
2000. At the 2002 Copenhagen European Summit, the EU leaders reiterated the Union's intention to 
welcome Romania as member in 2007 - "depending on further progress in complying with the 
membership criteria". Romania (along with Bulgaria) was invited to participate in the next 
Intergovernmental Conference as observer. 
 
3. Going West: Impact on Ideas 
The Cold War “victory” of the West affirmed the superiority of the “Western ways.” To the 
East, the West was the principle political, economic and cultural force: the West came to symbolize 
mainly consumer prosperity and personal freedoms, but also democracy, security, and human rights, 
which the suppressed socialist societies had for so long desired.  The West and being like the West 
were promoted by both western and CEE elites as a panacea for all problems. The EU presented 
itself as a haven of political and economic stability and had little choice but to applaud the transition 
efforts of Eastern Europe and promise support, it could not always supply.
115  The initial, mostly 
enthusiastic and willing, public commitment on behalf of the EU to assist in CEE transformation in 
order to “reunite Europe,” loomed the East’s aspiration to “return to Europe”.  Thus the Eastern 
“transition” / ”transformation” – a means by which CEECs pursue their interests, by articulating 
their identification with whom they belong and to whom they would like to belong and be like – 
became a surrender of Eastern identity to the Western project.  The “return to Europe,” confirmed by 
membership in the institutional expression of the European community, was therefore not just a 
strategic but also an identity choice.  A transition, which is completed signifies a new kind of 
identity, but the reverse argument – the reaffirmation of specific identity as a sign of a completed 
transition – is what drives the East and what makes it so desperately strive for membership.  
Aspiring to membership in the EU as a national priority altered the nature of domestic political life 
in CEECs.   
 
3.1 The Polish Civilization - an European Civilization? 
In the early 1990s, EU membership was considered only one of the options available to 
Poland but by the mid-1990s it had become the priority and prerequisite of Polish foreign policy.
116 
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The first post-communist government in Poland promoted the idea that the road to Poland’s 
economic recovery and to liberal democracy passed through membership in NATO and the 
EC/EU
117.  Opinion polls indicated that the new political class and the general public agreed even if 
the wish to join the EU was motivated by the deeply rooted idea of Europe without borders rather 
than by knowledge about the IO and its aims.
 118 The debate about the EU was framed as an identity 
choice: ”If Poland does not become a member of the EU, it will mean isolation, marginalization and 
in consequence the collapse of Polish civilization… We cannot at this moment let our fears [of 
losses] cause the process of building borders to begin anew, “ former Prime Minister Hanna 
Suchocka instructed parliament.
119  
On the one hand, that association between accession to the EU and the success of the 
transition to a capitalist democracy in the Polish public discourse sanctioned the notion that anyone 
who slows or challenges Polish membership in the EU is not following the country’s national 
interest. Therefore, even though there had been little constructive debate, the linkage EU 
membership-successful transition was so salient that the first post-socialist left coalition felt an 
obligation to reaffirm Poland’s commitment to EU integration (if only to enhance its democratic 
credentials).
120 European integration even received a Sejm sanction, as it was unanimously supported 
in 1994 by all parliamentary groups since most parties agreed to the principle of integration. The 
election of the Polish right back into office in 1997 brought unenthusiastic supporters of EU 
enlargement, although the politicians, appointed to positions of prominence concerning Polish 
integration into the EU, showed readiness to emphasize the advantages over the losses of accession, 
despite the anxieties of some parts of society.
121 Similarly, in its “yes” campaign, meant to encourage 
Poles to approve the country’s accession in the EU in the June 2003 referendum, the government 
focused on promises “that things will improve rapidly once Poland is inside the EU.”
122 Again, the 
understanding that the advancement of the country’s transformation depends on Polish membership 
in the EU was reflected in the 77.45% of votes in support of EU accession in the referendum of 7 
and 8 June 2003. 
On the other hand, the linkage between accession to the EU and Poland’s successful 
transition to a capitalist democracy precluded meaningful debate about Polish cooperation with the 
EU.  Instead of competing for the formulation of public and foreign policy, Polish elites have had to 
accept what Europe defines as legitimate and necessary, if not only because “the West knows best” 
but also because EU’s recommendation are requirement for accession.  
It should be noted that EU’s requirements were generally beneficial to the declared aims of 
the Polish transition.  However, the existence of numerous membership requirements has foreclosed 
debate about alternative (to EU-recommended) policies, thus limiting political accountability and 
representation. Since there was little constructive debate about the consequences of accession, the 
majority of Poles remained ignorant of the implications of membership –ignorance, which can 
preclude them from furthering their interests. For example, the right of foreigners to purchase land in 
Poland is opposed by three quarters of the Polish population but is a prerequisite for accession.
123 
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The unawareness of the essence of the accession process is also exemplified by the understanding of 
Polish elites that even though integration is “inevitable,” Poland should take part in it once Polish 
politicians have obtained favorable terms.
124 However, little in the accession process is debatable: 
funding and the deadlines for implementation of accession obligations and both only to some extent. 
This implies that some interests of Polish society could be unintentionally ignored, as would 
probably be the case with the Polish farmers or economic development of the Eastern borderlands.
125 
In fact, some have argued that it was this fear of severe economic hardship for those two groups that 
significantly reduced voter turnout (to 58.85%) at the June 2003 referendum.
126 Even though, an 
array of world leaders, including Pope John Paul II, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, 
Sweden's Prime Minister Goeran Persson and even U.S. President George W. Bush, beseeched Poles 
to vote “yes,” the majority of Poland’s rural population, comprising more than a third of the 
country's people, chose to stay home.  
 
3.2 The Cost of Overcoming Iliescu’s Nationalistic Agenda of the Early Transition 
At least officially, full integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures has been a key aim of 
Romanian foreign policy since the overthrow of Ceausescu.  After the Romanian revolution of 1989, 
a neo-communist leadership under President Ion Iliescu headed the country.  A return to Europe was 
prominent in the 10-point program, issued by the National Salvation Front in December 1989.  
President Iliescu subsequently authoritatively established European integration as a main objective 
of Romania’s foreign policy and built a general consensus among Romania's political parties around 
Romania’s full integration with Euro-Atlantic economic and military institutions.
127 This consensus 
was superficial and the Iliescu government and Romania’s political elite had little understanding 
what integration entailed.
 128  Romania’s early post-1989 foreign policy appears to have been 
concentrated far more on combating perceived threats from neighboring states than promoting 
cooperation with them.
129 The Iliescu government made little and slow progress in the cooperation 
with the EU. The obligations of the Europe agreement, however, stimulated reform in Romania and 
locked it into a path of westward oriented trade and development.
 130 
By 1992-1993, however, Romania was beginning to show increased interest in establishing 
closer ties with the EC/EU.  This reactive desire not to be excluded and to add a degree of 
respectability to Romania’s tarnished image was accompanied by a more considered and pro-active 
government policy on Euro-Atlantic integration.  
131 The first right and pro-European government 
reaffirmed Romania’s commitment to accession and was far more active in pursuing it.  Around the 
mid-1990s integration became synonymous with competition between political parties and leaders 
for recognition and favors from the West.
132  Accession became a power resource helping domestic 
actors translate their preference into policies by claiming that the policy is necessary for Romania’s 
integration in the EU. Moreover, the country’s underdeveloped political parties soon abandoned 
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policy formulation and confined themselves to implementation of EU composed programs (and 
some representation of their clientele at the expense of their constituencies).
 133  
A positive outcome of the lack of domestic debate on EU integration is that regardless of 
their political affiliation, the government programs of both parties have come to oscillate around 
Brussels’ recommendations rather than the nationalistic agenda of the early transition. A negative 
outcome is that since both major parties declare the same objectives, elites came to challenge each 
other’s competence to achieve the desired goals with statements like that of Foreign Minister, 
Mircea Geoana, ''It's only a small exaggeration to say that this [government] is a last chance for 
Romania to stay on track to join the European Union and NATO.”
134 Aspiration to join the EU has 
not only curtailed legitimate reform party platforms but also limited political competition, thus 
offering electoral accountability but no political accountability.
135 Even though the EU-endorsed 
package of policies commits successor (mainly ex-communist) parties to serious reform programs 
that they would never otherwise have adopted, it left the parties themselves crippled, unpopular, and 
underdeveloped. 
 
In conclusion, the cooperation with the EU altered the set of legitimate ideas in the CEE 
domestic political process. CEE and EU officials cooperated in order to help CEECs in their 
transformation and to establish liberal norms and values.  The EU consistently promoted a state that 
regulates, redistributes, privatizes, establishes rule of law, a state that is decentralized and 
administratively capable.
136 However, in the process of circumscribing the CEE political spectrum 
around liberal norms and values, the cooperation process has also limited political competition in 
general. This constrained domestic policy debate and hence legitimacy, accountability, and 
representation could be especially problematic in terms of the development of the party systems in 
CEECs, as parties were confined to compete on the “modus operandi rather than over substantive 
programmatic alternatives or ideological commitments.”
137 
 
4. The Acquis Communitaire – A Blessing or a Burden: Impact on Initiative 
Cooperation with the EU has redistributed the access to domestic initiative mainly in two 
ways: 1) through the recommendations of the so-called White Paper – a checklist of reforms 
necessary to speed the transition from socialist to market economy; and 2) through the accession 
negotiations process, constituting the legal harmonization of CEEC with EU regulations.   
Once the EU built an internal consensus on enlargement and became publicly committed to 
expansion, it also came forth with an accession strategy, the so-called White Paper.  The White 
Paper’s purpose was to assist the associated countries in their institution building. It identified in 
considerable detail, for each sector of the internal market, the key measures that the associated 
countries needed to adopt and the legal approximation necessary to bring their existing laws in line 
with the EU’s.  The Paper also suggested a logical sequence for the approximation program, while 
leaving it to each state to draw the timetable.  The Paper also prescribed structural reforms, 
necessary to make the recommended legislation effective and focused the use of PHARE funds to 
that end.  
The CEECs have also purchased a continuously changing institutional package – the EU’s 
massive regulatory framework.  In the bilateral negotiations to accession, the EC worked with 
governments to design accession strategies – Individual Accession Partnerships.  They map the path 
that each country must follow to go from wherever it stands to the EU level and to adopt the full 
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acquis communitaire. Or as colorfully described, “the head of the EU delegation is the most 
important person in the country next to the prime minister.  He is the latter’s best friend, feared ally, 
and domineering adviser.”
138  The strict implementation of the White Paper and the Accession 
Partnerships has been monitored by the European Commission. The Commission builds its opinion, 
whether cooperation towards membership with each applicant should be continued, based on the 
progress, made in the implementation of the White Paper and the Accession Partnerships.  
The introduction and adoption of the White Paper and the Individual Accession Partnerships 
has had several important consequences.  The Paper and the Partnerships “inevitably shift the focus 
of policy initiation and implementation towards the Commission – effectively internalizing EU-CEE 
relations rather than treating them as a part of the external policy process.”
139 Moreover, the move 
towards a technical approach to implementation depoliticizes a vast array of policies and 
institutional choices. It reduces input and influence of not only domestic interest groups but also 
domestic constituencies. The universal prescriptions – same requirements for all CEECs – allow for 
even less domestic representation since they do not take into consideration country particularities. 
Finally, this technicalization of the reform process also precludes domestic debates on the issues 
covered by the Commission. Therefore, cooperation with the EU has passed a significant fraction of 
domestic policy initiation to the supranational level and to the top portion to CEEC governments.  If 
such a shift is inherent to the process of international cooperation, the scope of domestic initiative 
transferred in the EU-CEEC case is unprecedented. 
 
5. Negotiating EU Membership: Impact on Institutions 
Cooperation with the EU has changed the functioning of domestic institutions primarily in 
two ways: by changing the practices of the already existing government institutions involved in the 
process and by necessitating the dissolution of some the establishment of institutions that would 
service the cooperation but also remain in place after accession.  If the modification of pre-existing 
government institutions is country-specific, the institutions set up to facilitate accession is more 
universal and depends on the cooperation stage.  At the association stage, the Europe Agreements 
provided for bilateral Association Councils at the ministerial level, Association Committees at 
ambassadorial level and advisory Parliamentary Committees.  The 1994 Essen Council introduced 
the “Multilateral Structured Dialogue,” which centered cooperation around CEE and EU ministerial 
meetings and annual meetings at the head of state/government level in the “margins of the European 
Council.” Finally, at the accession negotiations stage, the institutions provided for within Agenda 
2000’s Reinforced Pre-accession Strategy are a Presidency/Commission bilateral discussion format, 
complemented by an annual European Conference at the head-of-government level to discuss non-
economic – Common Security and Foreign Policy and Justice and home affairs – issues.  In brief, 
cooperation has been centered around the executive, thus empowering it with the colossal and 
important obligations of managing the integration process. 
European Agreements:  
Within the Association Councils, foreign ministers of the EU member states, government 
representatives from the associated country and the EU commissioner of the General Directorate on 
International Affairs met once a year to take binding decisions, where provided for by the Europe 
Agreements.  The Councils usually concerned themselves with broad political objectives and serve 
mainly to ratify agreements and position papers developed at the lower levels.  The Association 
Councils were also assigned the task of developing the “Political Dialogue,” meant to create “lasting 
links of solidarity and new forms of cooperation” and to facilitate the integration of the states “into 
the community of democratic nations.”
140 The Political Dialogue concerned developments in 
European CPSP.  Initially, the Dialogue utilized existing diplomatic channels and convened 
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meetings of the president of a candidate state with the presidency of the EU and the president of the 
European Commission but after a few years, the EU and CEEC agreed that the latter can associate 
themselves formally with declarations of the EU.   
The majority of the coordination and preparation work for the Association Councils was 
performed by the Association Committees.  They were staffed by senior ministry officials from the 
EU Member States, the Associates and the Commission.  The delegates representing the EU in the 
Association Committee could only commit it to decisions and actions that had been pre-approved by 
the General Affairs Council of the EU and any decision tabled at the Association Council was 
almost impossible to alter.  This not only depoliticized the issues but also created an imperative for 
the CEECs to influence the decisions politically at the lower level and in advance.
141 On the one 
hand, this procedure decreased both the number of issues that CEECs can influence and their 
chances of success.  On the other, it also presented the CEECs with a policy package (“all or 
nothing”). Packaging decreases the likelihood that the CEECs would reject the agreement but also 
increases the possibility that they would agree to a policy, which would not pass on its own.   
The Joint Parliamentary Committees, established as a forum for exchange of views and 
close political contacts between CEE parliaments and the European Parliament, met twice a year.  
The position of the European Parliament representatives was not strictly coordinated.  The Joint 
Parliamentary Committees are to be kept informed by and to make recommendations to the 
Association Council but they did not have to be consulted before a decision is reached.  The 
Committees were thus the weakest cooperation structure since their recommendations rarely 
impacted the executive decisions: the statements of these committees were rarely observed by the 
CEECs’ institutions and even less often considered by the Commission, the Council of Ministers or 
even the resolutions of the European Parliaments. In other words, it’s the executive that is 
empowered with resources and attention by the Europe Agreements.
142   
Pre-accession Strategy: Multilateral Structured Dialogue 
Both CEECs and the EU soon realized the limited effects of the “Political Dialogue” in 
speeding up integration and the demands for broader agenda and closer cooperation within an 
“enlarged Council” grew.  The 1994 Essen Council launched the “Pre-accession Strategy.” It 
consisted of a wide-ranging network of “structured dialogue” in several areas linked to integration: 
foreign policy, security policy, domestic and legal issues.  It involved Joint Ministerial Meetings, in 
which CEE and EU ministers, responsible for a specific field, met to discuss cooperation and 
progress in that issue area.  The enhanced dialogue was to speed governmental reorganization in 
CEE to address directly the new demands of the EU-CEEC association.  The distinguishing feature 
of the structured dialogue was its multilateralism.  In addition to the Joint Ministerial Meetings, head 
of CEE states and governments were invited to the second day of the EU Council meetings and 
foreign ministers and to the second day of the General Affairs Council.  CEECs were thus given the 
opportunity to “participate” in the EU process prior to the commencement of accession negotiations 
as a reward for their progress in democratic transition.
143 The dialogue – some complained – was still 
ineffective since its multilateralism effectively reduced the control of individual CEEC over EU 
decisions.
144 
Reinforced Pre-Accession Strategy: Partnership for Accession 
The Reinforced Pre-accession Strategy was launched to aid the EU in its bilateral 
discussions with each CEEC towards accession. To engage in negotiations, each applicant country, 
represented by its Chief Negotiator and his supporting team of experts, draws up the country’s 
position on each of the 31 chapters of the EU acquis.  The Presidency of the Council of Ministers 
presents the EU’s negotiating positions, prepared by the Commission and agreed to by the Council.  
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The Presidency of the Council of Ministers also chairs negotiating sessions held at the level of 
ministers or deputies, i.e. permanent representatives, for the Member States, and Ambassadors or 
Chief Negotiators for the applicants.  The Commission and most importantly its General Directorate 
for Enlargement are in close contact with the applicant countries in order to seek solutions to 
problems arising during the negotiations.  The negotiations focus on the terms under which the 
applicants will adopt, implement and enforce the acquis, that is, the granting of possible transitional 
arrangements, which must be limited in scope and duration.  The results of the negotiations are 
incorporated in an accession treaty, submitted to the Council for approval, to the European 
Parliament for assent, and to member states and applicant countries for ratification. Once again the 
executive has been privileged in terms of access and power in the accession negotiations. 
The PHARE political and institutional effects 
The institutionalization of the PHARE program has been comparatively more decentralized 
than other cooperation mechanisms.  Once Indicative Programmes are drawn up and funds allocated 
to each CEEC, the Commission only administers the dispatch of funds to the Program coordinator 
and the Program Management Unit in the partner countries.
145 The National Programs – upon which 
the whole PHARE program is based - are developed by the ministries and the national coordinators 
of the PHARE program.  After Essen, CEECs were given the opportunity to take a more active role 
in defining and managing their own programs as long as they were linked to the aims set out in the 
European Agreements and the Pre-accession Strategy. PHARE allowed the individual countries to 
retain policy initiative at the domestic – even if mostly executive – level and encouraged them to 
cooperate with local civil society in the preparation of the National Programmes. Even though the 
PHARE program has been criticized for being dominated by western consultants under contract with 
the commission and for heavy reliance on CEEC government (rather than civil society) mechanisms 
in both establishing national priorities and fund management, the PHARE program has yielded 
important political lessons.
 146  It has helped develop cross-border networks of cooperation to master 
common challenges for the region and has provided some channel for civil society participation, 
which in turn ensured potential for more domestic representation.
147  
In sum, cooperation between the EU and CEECs have given a central role to national 
executives, which came to be privileged in terms of political attention, access to the integration 
process, and commitment of resources – human, financial and informational.  Little debate over and 
initiative in Community Directives is possible and it is the executive that could possibly influence 
the negotiation terms politically.  Moreover, the technocratic bias in the EU approach means very 
limited parliamentary involvement beyond this formal structure.
148 
 
5.1 The Polish Experience 
Following the signing of the 1991 Europe Agreement, the Polish Council of Ministers 
established the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for European Integration and Foreign 
Assistance to prepare the country for an anticipated early accession. The Polish Council of Ministers 
sought to isolate Poland’s integration process from the frequent changes of government and the 
disputes of competencies between the prime-minister and the president.  The Office and its head, 
Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, were attached to the Prime-Minister’s Office in the position of an under-
secretary of state.  This established the power of the cabinet and the independence of the Office.  
The Plenipotentiary came to control and dominate the cooperation between Poland and the EU.  “All 
domestic aspects of integration, the White Paper exercise, and the use of PHARE related money for 
integration-related internal policies went through the hands of the Plenipotentiary.”
149  This 
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concentration of power, however, meant risking that the more technical and complex matters would 
be left out and that there would be no broadly based incorporation of all departments of government 
into the integration process.
150 In order to undertake the complex legislative objectives specified in 
the White Paper, Poland had to also set up a EU Integration Unit within each ministry. 
In 1996 a Committee for European Integration was established by a law to replace of the 
Office of the Plenipotentiary.  The Committee is chaired by the prime minister and includes the 
heads of almost every ministry, one parliamentary deputy and one leading academic.  The 
Committee takes decisions on accession issues.  It also coordinates and steers accession policy 
through the activity of the European Units, created within each ministry.  The political coordination 
of the process is achieved within the Committee, which convenes on a weekly basis to discuss the 
integration agenda of the government and most importantly to dissolve disputes to be settled 
between ministries.  In addition, in 1997 an Inter-ministerial Team for the Preparation of 
Documentation for Poland’s Negotiations Regarding Membership in the EU was established.  It 
comprised of 28 sectoral and 5 horizontal teams.  Even though the institution, responsible for 
cooperation with the EU, remained highly centralized, the change of its structure has helped provide 
faster solutions to even complex and multifaceted problems.  The structure was praised by EU 
officials as “by far the most effective,” since it facilitates contacts at all governmental levels and 
allows the EU to develop a clear picture of the complexity of some issues.
 151  Furthermore, through 
the administration, Poland began incorporating sectoral interests into the policy formulation process, 
thus effectively developing a national viewpoint on enlargement.
152  Moreover, in order to render 
itself compatible with the EU acquis communitaire, Poland defined and redefined the roles of the 
cabinet and the prime-minister, underwent numerous ministerial reorganizations, and restructured 
the senior civil service and the sub-national governance framework
 .
153  EU influence was aimed at 
aiding the strict delineation of executive responsibility, limiting disputes between state institutions, 
increasing state capacity and overcoming government centralization.   
It should also be noted that despite being given a marginal role in the integration process, 
the Sejm was quite active in trying to establish itself in the EU-Polish cooperation process.  In 1992, 
the Sejm passed a resolution recognizing the fundamental importance of the Europe Agreement to 
the future of the country and to the transformation of the Polish economy.  In order to ensure that the 
Europe Agreement would be implemented in a satisfactory manner, in 1992, the Sejm established an 
Extraordinary Commission to oversee the implementation of the treaty.
154 Then in 1994, the Sejm 
endorsed Poland’s accession to the EU with a declaration, unanimously supported by all 
parliamentary groups.  The Sejm also issued a resolution for the production of a National Strategy 
for Integration to summarize the measures taken to date and to formulate the priorities for the 
adjustment process.
155 The National Strategy for Integration was considered by the Sejm in 1997 and 
a set of implementation measures was drawn up setting out the work of individual government 
institutions.  Finally, in March 1998 the Sejm accepted a resolution that would allow for a ‘fast 
track” approach to EU integration.  The resolution, however, emphasized that one of the principle 
conditions of integration within the EU is that it must have the support of society.  To that end, 
Poland held a referendum on the ratification of its accession to the EU in June 2003.   
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5.2 Romania’s Reforms 
The Iliescu administration established the Department for European Integration within the 
Government as the institution responsible for cooperation with the EU.  The department was 
subsequently (1994) transformed into a Department for European Affairs within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  Similar departments were created in other ministries, whose activity was 
coordinated by the Inter-ministerial Committee for European Integration.  Only in 2001, with the 
intensification of cooperation with the EU, did the Romanian Government take “the necessary 
administrative and legislative measures to strengthen the leadership and to prepare efficiently the 
process of Romania’s accession to the European Union.”
 156 Preparation for EU entry spared 
widespread reforms in the Romanian executive. With increasing its interaction with the EU and in 
attempt to fully absorb the available EU funds, Romania was placed under great pressure for internal 
restructuring and greater inter-departmental coordination. The Natase Government has restructured 
government institutions to strengthen cross-ministerial cooperation and policy presentation. This led 
the EU Commission to note that the overall functioning of government has improved, which allowed 
for enhancing the efficiency of the legislature as well.
157  
In addition to strengthening the executive, the Ministry of European Integration was 
established with Government Resolution no.14/04.01.2001. The ministry ensures the coordination of 
Romania’s preparation for accession to the European Union, as well as the coordination of the 
accession negotiations.  Through its organization, the Ministry of European Integration coordinates 
“the economic transformations and institutional building in the preparation of accession in 
accordance with the programming instruments requested by the European Commission.”
158 The 
ministry gives binding legal opinion on all legal drafts that transpose Community provisions. 
Finally, the ministry not only coordinates the relations of Romania with EU institutions and with the 
Member States during the accession process but also manages the activity of the National 
Delegation.  Every ministry and institution of the central public administration with responsibilities 
in the field of acquis, is represented in the National Delegation.   
The Romanian parliament has been more apathetic to the accession process than the Polish 
Sejm.  The Romanian parliament did indeed endorse Romania’s integration in to the EU and 
subsequently prepared the 1995 “National Strategy for Preparing Romania's Accession to the 
European Union."  However, with its creation, the Ministry of European Integration assumed the 
elaboration of the National Programme and of other accession preparatory programs.  The Romanian 
parliament also adopted a “fast track” channel for integration related legislation, which additionally 
marginalized it. Still, the National Delegation provides some forum for inter-institutional 
negotiations as well as internal consultations with social partners, political parties and parliamentary 
committees, even if those are confined within Romanian readiness to accept any integration terms. 
 
In general, a shift to the top level of government – the level of the state-secretaries where the 
inter-ministerial committees are established – is quite pronounced in both Poland and Romania.  The 
shift of responsibility from lower levels to higher is partly because of the intensification of 
integration, which now requires genuine political cooperation and partly because of the elite-bias in 
the EU institutions, which prefer to cooperate with their counterparts in CEECs.  It has become 
increasingly important for CEEC governments to control policy-formation at the EU level and 
policy implementation at the national level.
159 So individual ministries are expanding to deal directly 
with European issues.  It’s the executive that has had the longest and most consistent role in EU 
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preparations, which gives it considerable power in the comprehensive adaptation process.  
Moreover, EU’s demands for managerial competence and central coordination favor concentration 
of cooperation in small teams, privileged in terms of resources.
160 The emergence of a core accession 
team in the executive, which controls the work programs of ministries and departments, is at the 
expense of the other government branches.  At the same time, under pressure to register fast 
progress, both countries have adopted fast-track procedures for passing EU legislation, which further 
limits the control parliaments exercise on state elites. 
 
6. Accountable for Brussels-Defined Goals: Impact on Information Distribution 
The European Union has effectively redistributed the sources of political and technical 
knowledge in CEECs.  Exchange of political information about the preferences and power of 
different actors within both CEECs and the EU has taken place in the Association Councils, the 
Political Dialogue Initiatives and the Accession Negotiations Delegations, where broad issues are 
discussed and the agenda for future cooperation set.  These institutions have strengthened and 
expanded the EU-CEE executive networks and have provided a forum for building consensus 
around reforms advocated by the EU.  In such forums, the CEEC leaders have had the opportunity to 
pick up the ”correct” ideas and information, conveyed by their EU counterparts, and later 
rearticulate and implement them domestically. 
And if at those forums EU officials convey primarily general reform expectations, the 
Annual Reports on the progress made toward accession of individual CEECs, spell out in detail 
EU’s more technical preferences.  The Annual Reports are a written, publicly available, and obliging 
testimony of EU’s preferences. As such the Reports are used by the EU to mobilize support for 
specified reforms within CEE government and among the general population through media 
publicity.  Because European integration has become such a priority issue, the reports receive 
unusual attention by the press in both countries.  The Reports comprise an evaluation of the work of 
CEE governments by a powerful institution and thus are important at two levels: at the international 
level, a country’s accession negotiations are compromised or could be blocked if the Commission’s 
opinion in those reports had been that not enough progress is made; at the domestic level, a negative 
Commission opinion is politically and electorally costly, since obstructing the country’s EU 
accession is considered to threaten the country’s national interest.  Finally, while CEE executives 
use the Reports to justify unpopular reforms by legitimizing themselves with the EU’s authority and 
domestic opposition use the Reports to challenge the ruling elite’s ability to return the country to 
Europe.  Therefore, the Annual Reports have become a powerful instrument for redistribution of 
political information in favor of mobilization of support for EU recommended action.   
The Annual Reports and the Commission’s Opinion of 1997 have been effective in 
increasing domestic competition and thus eliciting CEE responses.  For example, the Commission’s 
comments were used to identify priorities for all the institutions of the Polish administration.
161  
Romania has also been conscientious of the deficiencies and delays, signaled in the Opinions of the 
European Commission and used them as a base for the National Programme for EU Accession, the 
Action Plan and the Macroeconomic Framework of the Medium Term Economic Strategy, as well as 
the 2002 Government legislative harmonization program.  In addition to preparing the Annual 
Reports, the EU Commission also plays the role of internal and external mediator.  It recommends a 
common position to be agreed on by the Council and that takes into consideration not only what the 
member states would be ready to agree amongst themselves but also what the applicant country will 
be ready to accept.  The Commission’s advice to candidate countries on what is possible in the 
political and often tendentious circumstances of the Council is usually crucial.
162 
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Recently, the EU launched its Communication Strategy for Enlargement – the third track in 
the preparations for enlargement in addition to the pre-accession strategy (the reform process in the 
candidate countries) and the accession negotiations.  The strategy aims to explain to the public in the 
current and future member states why the Union is about to undertake its largest and most ambitious 
enlargement so far, and what the consequences of this step are likely to be.  The 1997 Polish 
National Strategy for Integration also saw the need for a concerted information campaign but it was 
implemented only several months before the June 2003 referendum.
163  
In addition to mobilizing support for reform, the EU provided CEECs with technical 
information about the structure and responsibilities of key institutions in liberal democracies.  When 
requiring the CEECs to comply with the White Paper and the Accession Partnerships, the EU sought 
to disburse a particular set of understandings, derived from the European experience that were a 
“desirable” or “better” alternatives to past and current CEEC institutions.  Moreover, through 
PHARE, a new bureau – the Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office – was set up as a 
database of expertise and other information to assist CEE market adaptation.
164 In addition to the 
numerous exchange programs for placing CEE officials within the EU institutions, in 1998, the 
Commission established the so-called Twinning Exercise, which assigns civil servants from EU 
member states to the CEECs with a task to speed the setting up of institutions for implementation of 
the acquis.
165   
In brief, the EU-CEEC cooperation has changed the CEEC domestic access to political and 
technical information so as to favor EU accession.  The various EU institutions have used their 
authority to promote certain institutional definitions – for example, what a state should look like and 
what the state should do – and therefore encourage a set of reforms.  As an established and respected 
community of liberal democracies, the EU referred to its own tradition and experience to justify the 
recommended redefinition, specified in the Europe Agreements, White Paper, and Accession 
Partnerships.  Then again through its social prestige and because of the power asymmetry in the EU-
CEEC relations, the EU encouraged their implementation.  The EU has made explicit its preferences 
to CEEC elites and its evaluation of the CEE government work to the public thus mobilizing 
domestic competition and support for accession at both levels.   
 
7. Summary of Findings 
The EU has encouraged the development of limited government, rule of law, the autonomy 
of legal order, improved state capacity, increased domestic competition, and respect for human and 
minority rights. The importance of those positive outcomes cannot be overestimated but the resultant 
costs should also be acknowledged.  By encouraging consensus on EU accession, the EU has come 
to limit CEE debates on integration issues.  CEE elites tended to present accession as a strategic 
identity choice, synonymous with the transition to liberal democracy and market economy, a choice 
that should therefore not be questioned.  At the same time, this linkage has allowed for and 
legitimized both the transfer of policy initiation towards the EU and the technicalization of much of 
public policy.  Large portions of the reform process have been coordinated by the EU and top CEEC 
officials thus removing it from domestic control.  Domestic forums have been marginalized by the 
adoption of fast-track procedures for passing EU legislation, which further limits the control 
parliaments exercise on elites.  Moreover, the EU evaluation of government progress in the reform 
process became more and more influential.  This policy shift to the international level has been 
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complemented with a shift to the top level of CEE governments, which received considerable power 
in the comprehensive adaptation process.  The cooperation process led to the expansion of the 
executives’ scope of activity and resources.  At the same time, the cooperation process has allowed 
for very limited parliamentary involvement outside the formal cooperation structures, where 
parliaments were accorded insignificant functions.   
The marginalization of domestic forums could potentially decrease elites’ accountability and 
impair the development of CEE party systems.  The policy shift to the international level has 
diminished popular representation.  Those trends not only exacerbate the communist legacy of 
political elitism but are also likely to persist after CEEC accession to the EU.  “EU membership will 
certainly safeguard formal civil liberties, political rights, and general human rights.  But the capacity 
of ordinary citizens to act in politically meaningful ways in pursuit of their own interests will be 
further undermined by the conditions of EU membership”
166 or by what some have termed as the 
EU’s democratic deficit.  Moreover, as Kuehnhardt points out "EU membership presupposes well-
organized interest groups, NGOs, and political parties, in addition to well-trained civil servants, all 
capable of negotiating and sustaining credible commitments and effective policy positions.”
167 
However, the decline in living standards has had a negative impact on the capacity of many CEE 
citizens to promote their interests and some estimate that even Poland’s relatively strong activist 
networks is going to find it difficult to navigate all the relevant levels of representation, given their 
limited financing and experience.   
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PART THREE: CONCLUSION 
1. Similarities 
The end of the Cold War inspired a reevaluation of the role of governments worldwide as 
the notion of state and the concepts of democracy and liberalism were reexamined in the light of 
globalization and the post-Cold War environment.
168  In Eastern Europe the democratic 
transformations became tightly interwoven with international cooperation, as organizations like the 
EU and NATO became not only the international environment for CEE democratization processes 
but also received the opportunity to influence the direction of the CEE transitions.
169  The EU and 
NATO were particularly attractive to Eastern European states as a welfare-enhancing common 
market and a security-enhancing political community.  Striving for membership in those 
international organizations provided not only a foreign policy goal but also clues as to the domestic 
policies necessary to achieve this goal.  In this sense, the EU and NATO provided normative targets 
for EE states well before the organizations had set out any membership requirements or even agreed 
to enlarge.
170 In sum, EU and NATO’s identification with democracy and membership obligations 
served to further CEE efforts to strengthen political reforms. 
Through sanctions, conditional aid, examples to emulate, and later through economic and 
political standards, transcribed into membership requirements or direct expert advice, the EU and 
NATO exported to CEECs their vision of liberal democracy.  From the beginning of the Eastern 
European transitions, Western aid became conditional on further democratization and such aid was 
withheld if a country’s democratization prospects looked bad, as happened in Romania in 1990.  The 
EU and NATO and their member-states served as specific models when CEECs made decisions 
about which democratic institutions to put in place.  Moreover, some have estimated that about three 
quarters of the requirements of EU membership are consistent with reforms that most observers 
would consider necessary to build a stable liberal democracy and a functioning market economy but 
also reforms of the judiciary, the civil service and state administration.
171  Two of the five principle 
requirements for NATO membership are functioning democracy and market economy.  Both 
organizations have also attached experts in key CEE ministries to help the candidate countries 
compose reform programs consistent with the goals of membership in the two IOs.  Furthermore, in 
some countries with less developed party systems like Romania, both organizations worked with 
pro-reform opposition parties to provide them with a convincing electoral platform based on 
economic prosperity achieved through acceptance in both organizations.
172  In general, IOs improved 
political competition and accountability by presenting publicly a fairly accurate assessment of the 
quality of reform in aspiring states in relation to the candidate’s prospects for membership.  In 
conclusion, most academics and practitioners believe that locking the applicants into the Western 
community in the long term is likely to reinforce democracy in indirect and direct ways, as some 
have argued happened in Spain, Portugal and Greece.
 173  
Most important to this work, both the EU and NATO promoted a neoclassical form of 
liberal democracy that rests on a clear distinction of public from private activity, both of which are 
protected by a representative government and a responsive administration with public behavior 
being supported by the activity of secondary associations capable of encouraging and representing 
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private activity within legal limits.  These become a barrier to creeping interventionism of the state 
and more particularly elite control of the state.  These characteristics must be assisted by an 
informed and free flow of public information and political elites who by example reinforce these 
values in their exercise of open, limited and responsible governance.
174 On the one hand, the EU 
promoted and encouraged the restructuring of the executive in the direction of the clear delimitation 
of its responsibilities and greater inter-departmental coordination in both Romania and Poland.  On 
the other hand, NATO not only established a balanced type of civil-military relations in both Poland 
and Romania to keep the military forces under steady civilian democratic control but in Romania the 
alliance also broadened the scope of defense and security institutions to include other (non-
governmental and quasi-governmental) institutions governing the domestic order and civil society.  
As a result of the interaction with both IOs, the Romanian and Polish executives were reformed to 
be able to better articulate “national interests” without disputes about the prerogatives of the 
different executive institutions. 
While recognizing these positive benefits, one should acknowledge that cooperation 
between CEECs and the two IOs came at some cost.  Particularly problematic have been the thinness 
of public debate in both member states and applicant countries about the importance or the political 
and economic implications of expansion and a clear bias toward executive autonomy relative to 
domestic groups.  The IOs-CEEC cooperation has redistributed control over domestic initiative, 
procedures, informational means, and over the domestic set of legitimate ideas, and has thus 
influenced the way domestic forces exercise control over their elites.  The result is the indirect 
marginalization of parliament - and the citizenry at large - and the strengthening of executive 
prerogatives. 
The EU and NATO effectively shaped the domestic debate in their respective issue fields.  
In Poland, former dissidents in cooperation with officials from the two IOs set the terms of the 
political debate.  Future economic prosperity and the fate of the democracy project were linked to 
being/acting like the West, and eventually becoming part of the West by securing membership in the 
two IOs.  Membership in those two organizations were presented as a strategic cultural choice and 
failure to cooperate and comply with the reform recommendations of the IOs was presented as 
handicapping the transition to liberal democracy and market economy.  On the one hand this 
legitimized the influence of the two IOs in translating the liberal norms into policy prescriptions.  
Such a linkage allowed the two IOs and their supporters in CEE to limit the set of legitimate policies 
to include only ones that support the liberal democratic norms exported by the West.  On the other 
hand however, this framing of the CEE political debate coupled with the practice of the two IOs to 
encourage consensus on integration issues might have precluded any meaningful debate about the 
integration process.  The two IOs and their CEE supporters insisted that the policies they are 
promoting are not just a political model but simply technical “best practice” that should therefore not 
be questioned. 
In Romania, unreformed communists were shaping the political debate in the first years of 
the transition.  They kept up a rhetoric of working earnestly to join the EU because a certain level of 
Western acceptance strengthened their domestic credentials as “reformers” while Western loans and 
trade agreements provided the much needed economic resources for sustaining their rule.  Because 
of the concentration of power in their hands, unchecked by other political forces, they could also 
mislead the electorate that they are advancing towards Europe.  However, setting up integration as 
Romanian priority allowed the two IOs to affect Romania’s domestic policy choices, making the 
opportunity costs of illiberal politics at home unusually high. Iliescu’s administration was attacked 
for forsaking the country’s prospects of a return to Europe by both the IO officials, and opposition 
politicians and local civil society leaders, coached by the IOs.  Soon the political debate started 
resembling the one in Poland.  Both parties tried to fit the increasingly attractive “pro-EU space” on 
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the political spectrum and the two IOs circumscribed not only the substance of the Romanian liberal 
democratic agenda but possibly also the political debate in general. 
Coupling the fate of the democracy project with membership in the two IOs, not only 
precluded domestic debate on important transition issues but also allowed for and legitimized the 
transfer of policy initiation towards the two IOs.  Large portions of reform process were coordinated 
by the IOs and top CEEC officials, thus becoming increasingly independent of domestic control.  
This policy shift to the international level has been complemented with a shift to the top level of 
CEEC governments, which received considerable power in the comprehensive adaptation process.  
The cooperation process has led to the expansion of the executives’ scope of activity and resources.  
Moreover, even if steps were taken to build parliament’s oversight capacity, domestic democratic 
forums were marginalized by the adoption of fast-track procedures for passing EU legislation or 
Romania’s use of executive acts for defense and security issues reform, which further limited the 
control parliaments exercise on elites.  At the same time, the cooperation process has allowed for 
very limited parliamentary involvement outside the formal cooperation structures, where parliaments 
were accorded insignificant functions.  As a result, executive centered cooperation with the EU and 
NATO has led to a relative marginalization of democratic forums, whether they were initially 
developed (operational, well-functioning) as in Poland or not, as in Romania.   
 
While the EU and NATO are democracy-promoting IOs, they are also in certain ways 
compromising the democratization project.  It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate the 
possible explanations of the unintended, and quite paradoxical, empowerment of the executive.  Yet, 
it might be useful to quickly highlight the possible interests and incentives that have produced the 
tension between the IOs’ democracy promotion means and ends.  In the West, democracy promotion 
became considered as one of the most effective means of achieving global stability and thus 
European security.
175 However, promoting democracy as both a means and an end has its advantages 
and disadvantages and amongst the costs is the priority assigned to other (usually economic or 
security) issues if the latter are in conflict with the first.  Therefore, the role of democracy promotion 
for democracy’s sake in EU and NATO’s involvement in EE should not be overemphasized.  At the 
same time, however, one must remember that the marginalization of the domestic democratic forums 
is not an intended policy.   
The complexity of the democratization problems, the short political deadlines for meeting 
the membership criteria with limited resources, and the constitutional “near-monopoly” of the 
executive in foreign policy, compelled IO officials and CEE elites to pursue short-term benefits over 
long-term development: the two IOs chose to work directly through the top governmental level 
rather than rely on the mercy of inexperienced parliaments.  In turn, the thus structured cooperation 
has probably created the wrong incentives by isolating the executive instead of encouraging it to 
cooperate with other social and political institutions.  Furthermore, the IOs have a tangible interest in 
isolating to some extent CEE executives from domestic vested interests, while themselves 
maintaining channels to directly influence EE transitions.  Finally, both IOs have been very sensitive 
to instability or political discontinuity on the part of governments in candidate countries.  Therefore 
they have emphasized that cross-party consensus over accession is very important because it 
strengthens a government’s position in relation to the two IOs and to domestic opinion.  This, 
however, produced a seeming domestic consensus, which has prevented meaningful debates about 
integration.   
 
2. Differences 
2.1 NATO vs the EU 
For the first time in their history both the EU and NATO have created formal accession 
criteria, which have given them a wide leverage to influence the transformation of Central and 
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Eastern European Countries and have reduced the ability of applicants to negotiate entrance and 
membership concessions.  As the world’s most highly institutionalized and rule-constrained regional 
integration project, the EU offers the greatest benefits of membership and the most extensive 
requirements.  The EU requirements are more far-reaching, non-negotiable, uniformly applied and 
closely enforced.  Not only did the EU’s involvement in CEEC post-communist transitions span to a 
wider policy domain – from banking and insurance regulations to clean judiciary – but the accession 
requirements for each of those issue areas were more detailed and strict.  The European Commission 
also developed criteria to evaluate the candidate’s record and has insisted on more or less fair and 
meritocratic accession process.
176  
NATO, on the other hand, was primarily involved in CEEC defense and security matters.  
However, NATO’s definition of security threats as coming from potential internal socio-economic 
instability in Eastern Europe allowed the alliance to insist on and be involved in reforming also the 
ministries of labor, interior, industry, transportation and finance in Romania (and other MAP 
countries) in order to improve their ability to cooperate with the ministry of defense.  The criteria for 
membership put forth by NATO were more general and therefore, candidate evaluation was more 
loose and interpretative.  Furthermore, NATO’s accession decisions are less meritocratic and more 
political than the EU’s.  By the time, NATO invited Poland to the alliance, there were still 
outstanding problems in civil-military relations and Poland had not even begun providing channels 
for civil society involvement in defense and security institutions. It could also be argued that by the 
time Romania was offered membership in the alliance, it still did not qualify as democracy or market 
economy.   
If in the beginning of its cooperation with CEECs, NATO used primarily regular diplomatic 
channels to influence reform of defense and security institutions, through the years, the accession 
path became more and more institutionalized.  For example, Poland was advised or compelled to 
reform mainly through bilateral, high-level meetings between NATO and Polish civil and military 
officials.  However, while actively preparing the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for 
membership, NATO encountered unexpected difficulties, which called for re-evaluation of these 
cooperation practices.
177  The alliance came up with a resolution to become more deeply involved in 
CEE restructuring through the Membership Action Plan.  MAP included systematic consultation and 
workshops between aspiring countries and NATO Teams over the political, economic, defense, 
resource, security and legal aspects of membership.  MAP also enhanced the monitoring of 
candidate progress. 
The EU came to exercise the greatest potential leverage on the domestic politics of applicant 
countries, partly because of the attractiveness of the organization and partly because it presented all 
aspiring countries with the same detailed non-negotiable requirements list.  In contrast, NATO 
worked with each candidate individually from the beginning.  Progress in accession with NATO 
depended mostly on the fulfillment of country-specific conditions.  This allowed the alliance to 
target the particular weaknesses of each applicant and suggest a country-specific solution.  Not 
having to rely on an exhaustive requirement list added to the attractiveness of the organization, since 
membership seemed achievable in a shorter time span.  The seeming accessibility of the alliance 
added to its leverage on domestic reform in CEECs.  The individuality of reform programs that 
NATO promoted increased the alliance’s legitimacy.  NATO accepted that there is not single model 
of authority relations between civilians and the military, which has allowed for certain amount of 
national sovereignty.  Accordingly, NATO officials had to spend much more time than EU officials 
teaching CEEC officials about the meaning of democratic civilian control or persuading the Eastern 
Europeans that, for example, balanced civil-military relations are the best type of civilian authority.  
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In contrast, the EU worked under the assumption that CEECs’ aspiration and the performance of the 
organization are the necessary legitimization. 
 
 
2.2 Romania vs Poland 
Polish politicians were generally better received by the two IOs.  The interaction between 
Polish and IO officials was much more of a cooperative effort: the former sincerely eager to carry 
out democratization reforms and the later more willing to help.  Not only was Poland a symbol of 
the massive protests against communism, but also a powerful and geo-strategically well-positioned 
country.  It behaved with the self-esteem of a country that belongs to the West and that could not be 
left out.  At the same time, it tried to carry out reforms to the liking of the two IOs even before it was 
required to do so.  Most problematic was not that Poland would not adopt democratic policies but 
rather that Polish elites behind composing those policies had flawed understandings of basic 
concepts.  An example at hand is the widespread understanding that coordinate civil-military 
relations is an optimal civilian authority type.  In order to avoid such faulty understandings, the EU 
provided detailed reform blueprints. 
Both IOs were more disinterested in the fate of Romania.  Iliescu’s near-authoritarian and 
belligerent rule and little desire to proceed rapidly towards integration alienated the West.  Still, both 
IOs preferred to see Romania aspiring to the West and worked to change Iliescu’s agenda.  Upon 
failing to change his behavior, the two IOs started working to prop up the opposition and ready it to 
assume power.  However, even the pro-Western Romanian politicians were rather reactive and very 
dependent on the two IOs for advice on the direction and details of reform.  Moreover, the process 
of building democracy in Romania has been extremely sensitive to the external environment and 
active backing from abroad.  Romania showed greater political fragility when its Western prospects 
dimmed, demonstrating what decisive effects external support could have.  However, it also appears 
that the manner in which assistance was provided mattered, as well.  The first set of NATO advisers, 
for example, with a more authoritarian style of prescribing reforms were largely unsuccessful and 
only after they were substituted with a team that seemed interested in Romania and spent time 
working with local actors, did NATO start really impacting the reform process.
178 
Both IOs have been keenly aware of Romania’s poorly institutionalized parties, lacking 
ideologies or government programs, the weakness of civil society and the state. They offered the 
external assistance that began to appear more and more a sine qua non to sustaining reform.  The 
two IOs worked much more with Romania (and hardly at all with Poland) to enhance state capacity 
and create channels for civil society participation.  Then again, the weakness of the Romanian 
parliament seems to have encouraged and facilitated the more dramatic redistribution of access to 
initiative and especially institutions with the Romanian government reforming entire sectors 
(defense and security, for example) with executive acts rather than parliamentary legislation.  In 
contrast, in Poland, the Sejm was much stronger and made numerous attempts to establish itself in 
the cooperation process within the limited space left to it by the executive.  In general in Poland, the 
democratization project received little attention from either IOs and if Polish parties and parliament 
were well developed and functioned satisfactorily, Poland could have gained a lot from ensuring 
venues for civil society participation in Polish governance structures.   
Finally, the Romanian case well demonstrates a curious conclusion of this study, namely 
that cooperation with both IOs has empowered the executive, the political leadership heading CEE 
states, in general, not just pro-IOs reformers.  It is true that both IOs were more likely to work with 
and assist Romania’s pro-Western government but even at the time of Iliescu’s rule, a significant 
redistribution of access to political resources in favor of the executive was already under way.  
Furthermore, non-reformist governments were more likely to abuse that transfer of power and claim 
non-existing progress towards Europe or IO backing for their own agenda.  The ability of domestic 
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actors and institutions to resist IO pressure or accommodate it without losing their core logic should 
not be underestimated.   
In conclusion, it should be emphasized, however, that IOs’ pressures have been distorted by 
selective exaggeration of certain political issues over others either due to particular international 
concerns or because of domestic factors.  For example, especially in Romania (but the other 
countries as well) political conditions were subordinate to those of economic reform and state 
capacity.  Targeting Romania’s persistent problems with implementing the economic transformation 
and with a weak state capacity – also a motor of democratic consolidation – were a priority.
179  This 
study also demonstrates how the interplay between external and internal factors produced different 
reform dynamics in the two countries studied.  Poland was far more successful in utilizing the 
reform potential of the enlargement process than Romania not just because of its more favorable 
internal environment but primarily because of its willingness to do so early in the transition and to 
continue doing so even after.  Some of these discrepancies can further be explained by the relatively 
‘soft’ IO conditionality in certain fields (including some aspects of democratization) or the 
fragmented and diverse manner with which the IOs chose to police reform in Eastern Europe that 
allowed the reinforcement of the significance of domestic factors mediating the IO impact.  The 
diverse and non-linear nature of IO impact should be highlighted.  Integration is of course not 
uniform at all levels, nor does it occur at the same pace in every political.   
 
3. Some Implications at the Domestic Level: Prospects for the Democratization Project 
Both IOs helped CEECs in making accountability effective by encouraging well-defined and 
legally established institutional boundaries that delimit the proper exercise of authority – a 
prerequisite for institutional autonomy.  Such a network of boundaries and controls that state 
agencies exercise over other state agencies, i.e., horizontal accountability
180, are an important part of 
the formal institutionalization of the full package of democracy.  However, in some cases, for 
efficiency’s sake and quick reform results, the cooperation process has promoted or ignored the 
encroachment of one state agency upon the lawful authority of another.  For example, reform of 
defense and security legislation in Romania after 1996 was promoted exclusively through executive 
acts rather than through parliamentary legislation.  Another example of the possible infringement on 
horizontal accountability is the tendency to weaken parliamentary oversight over the executive.  
Cooperation with both IOs has entailed the coordination of large portions of reform outside domestic 
control: legislation initiated at the suggestion of either IO passes through parliament with special 
priority (fast-track channels for EU-required laws), that is without much modification or discussion. 
Bypassing the legislature not only did little to improve the already weak parliamentary oversight in 
the region but also, “deprived the incompletely democratized EE of the most important school of 
democracy – the necessity to hamper a coherent policy out of a cacophony of domestic interests and 
opinions.”
181 Such practices, especially if maintained in the long term could prove problematic for 
CEE democratic consolidation. 
In addition to focusing on fortifying the institutional foundations of the executive, reforms 
recommended by both IOs have centered on its depolitization.  Given the communist legacy of 
partisan state administration, reforms have emphasized the establishment of clear boundaries 
between the administrative and political components of the executive.  However, under communism 
governments were mere executives since the preparation and assessment of policy alternatives were 
discussed within the party.  This legacy persists not only because inexperienced officials find it 
difficult to make an active contribution to preparing political decisions and to managing of conflict 
                                                 
179 Geoffrey Pridham,  “Romania and the European Union Accession: The Domestic Dimension,” Romanian Journal of 
Society and Politics, 1.2 (2001): 21-48. 
180 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusions About Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy, 7.2 (1996): 34-51 addresses why the term 
is problematic. 
181 Stephen Holmes, “A European Doppelstaat?” East European Politics and Societies, 17.1 (Winter 2003): 107-118.   51   
resolution inside government and between the government and other political institutions 
(parliament, parties and civil society), but also because cooperation with both IOs has created an 
environment, in which political directions are formulated from outside.
 182  Executive politicians are 
tempted and encouraged to seek policy advice and managerial skills from outside the executive 
bureaucracy and to bypass it in favor of more informal networks or small entourages placed outside 
the administration (the party or the IOs).  Such a practice is likely to contribute negatively to the 
long-run democratization of CEECs.  
The transfer of initiative powers to the international and somewhat to the top executive 
levels could have possible negative consequences on policy legitimacy.  Effectiveness can hardly 
replace representation as an independent basis of legitimacy and informal groups and networks 
should not substitute parliament as important center of authority.
183 This lack of popular engagement 
and diminished popular representation could create a potential for widening the gap between 
political elites and masses, already a problem in many post-communist democracies.
184 Two 
important consequences emerge: 1) because reforms were promoted by executive networks, 
implementation has been often times problematic; 2) state elites had to now satisfy two groups – 
domestic and more importantly international.
185 Since the essence of effective democracy lies in the 
clear lines of accountability running from the government to electorate that can use competition 
among political parties to hold it responsible for policy, the new and increasingly important layer of 
accountability seems to have altered the principles of representation and accountability – 
foundations of democracy.
186 
The institutional empowerment of the executive through the cooperation process could 
possibly have implications for the power of CEE states.  The successful consolidation of democracy 
in CEE requires complementary rebuilding to increase the infrastructural capacity of the state, i.e. 
the capacity of the state to actually penetrate society and to implement logistically political decisions 
throughout the realm.  The EU reform package includes reforms that target improving state’s 
capacity and special attention has been paid to that objective in the PHARE program.  However, the 
democratization process also necessitates diminishing the despotic power of CEE states, that is the 
range of actions, state elites are empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized 
negotiations with civil society groups or with the parliaments.  Michael Mann argues that “state 
infrastructural power derives from the social utility in any particular time and place of forms of 
territorial-centralization which cannot be provided by civil society forces themselves, and 
furthermore, that the extent of state despotic power derives from the inability of domestic forces to 
control those forms of territorial centralization, once set up.”
 187  In line with this argument, the IOs 
involvement can be perceived as pressure on CEECs to import unmediated shifts in infrastructural 
power with sometimes little root in society.  In fact, this appears to be increased infrastructural 
empowerment of the state but one that cannot be controlled by the CEECs societies.  Thus it has 
probably become a vehicle for increased despotic power of CEE states, which could serve to 
undermine the democratization project.   
The marginalization of domestic forums could have impaired the development of the party 
systems in CEECs.  Party politics in CEE developed overwhelmingly from within the parliamentary 
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arena and not from grassroots constituencies, which gave politicians the opportunity to frame the 
new political debate from the top-down.
188  However, the spectrum of the political debate in CEE 
was constrained by the international and domestic consensus for neo-liberal market reforms as 
promoted by the EU and NATO and Western blueprints for public policy.  The narrowing of the set 
of legitimate policies left CEE parties little competitive leeway but to dispute each other’s 
competence in achieving the desired result rather than the constitution of the desired result.  It’s the 
perception that there is “no alternative” that has constrained both responsive and accountable party 
competition.  CEE political systems offer electoral but little political accountability.  As the 
discussion on ideas in both Romania and Poland shows, parties went in and out of office but their 
policies did not.
189 Even though, both EU and NATO impacted information asymmetries by 
providing information on the government’s progress in the reform process, which reinvigorated 
competition, parties were questioning mainly their opponents’ identity and credibility to carry out 
the country’s return to Europe.  The evolution of party competition in the region has “a form of 
dependent development, which might in the long run preclude the development of accountable 
domestic politics and of public ideological debate.”
190 
In general, IOs’ efforts to promote democratic development run against the incentives 
created by the accession processes, which have disproportionately empowered the executive at the 
expense of domestic groups and most notably parliament.  The incentives and constraints, created by 
the cooperation process, favor the executive, which in turn reinforces a historical tendency within 
CEEC towards political hierarchy.  Many studies suggest that once initial political and institutional 
choices have been made, the realities created by these choices make it difficult to change course. 
Therefore, the policy implications of this study should not be lightly dismissed. 
 
4. Some Implications at the International Level 
The conclusions of this study confirm some of the arguments made in the literature that 
studies the importance of external actors in bolstering CEE civil society.  Just as in the civil society 
promotion cases, institutions that joined the international circuit neglected their own communities 
and tended to reflect the agenda and moral concerns of the external actors.
191 Very much like INGO 
assistance, foreign aid has helped design and build institutions associated with democratic states but 
has done little to ensure that these institutions operate in a manner consistent with democratic 
consolidation.
192 This study also confirms the conclusions of other works on international 
cooperation/socialization that IOs’ greatest influence was in cases in which the advice was 
consistent and detailed and in which the applicant countries showed strong political will to 
implement the requested institutional models and policy change.
193  
This study of the impact of international cooperation with the EU and NATO has had on 
elite autonomy and democratization in CEE is conceptually linked to the Europeanization literature 
as it examines a certain dimension of Europeanization, namely structures of representation.
194  As 
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On a more theoretical level, it must be noted that the strengthening of state elites is not 
necessarily EU- driven since the same process was observed with NATO’s involvement in CEE.  The 
dynamic is rather inherent to the internationalization of policy-making.  International cooperation 
severely restricts formal participation in decision-making by most domestic actors other than the 
executive as issues that were once handled by domestic parliaments and publics are bargained in secret 
diplomatic sessions and handled by domestic constitutional procedures designed for "high politics" 
issues of traditional foreign policy. In other words, international cooperation often bestows functional 
benefits unevenly across domestic actors; in particular, it tends to benefit disproportionately those who 
control access to the international policy arena – most often, though not invariably, national 
executives.
198  Therefore, theories of international cooperation, which treat states as unitary actors and 
overlook the domestic distribution of international collective action benefits appear inadequate in 
capturing this dynamic. 
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